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INTRODUCTION
The end of 1999 marked the introduction of two new weapons to
assist trademark owners in their battles against cybersquatters, or per-
sons who "attempt to profit from the Internet by reserving and later
reselling or licensing domain names back to the companies that spent
millions of dollars developing the goodwill of the trademark."1 First,
the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)
approved its Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy
(UDRP)2 and its accompanying rules3 for use in resolving most cyber-
squatting disputes beginning January 3, 2000.4 The UDRP, which is
incorporated by reference into the registration agreements of all ac-
credited registrars,5 purports to provide an on-line administrative pro-
cedure directed at "cybersquatters" to resolve trademark disputes in
less than forty-five days and for about $1000 in fees.6 Second, on No-
vember 29, 1999, President Clinton signed into law the Anticyber-
1 Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1233 (N.D. 111. 1996); see also 4
J. THOMAS McCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADFmKS AND UNFAIR COMPETMON § 25:77
(4th ed. 2000) ("A 'cybersquatter' is one who knowingly reserves with a registrar a
domain name consisting of the mark or name of a company for the purpose of relin-
quishing the right to that domain name back to the legitimate owner for a price."
(citations omitted)). The UDRP, as will be discussed infra Part I, employs a multi-part
test to determine whether a domain name has been registered in bad faith, the grava-
men of cybersquatting.
2 INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NASs AND NUMBERS, UNIFORM DOMAIN
NAM DISPUTE RESOLUTION Poucy, at http://vw.icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy-
24oct99.htm (last modified June 4, 2000) [hereinafter UDRP].
3 INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS, RuLEs FOR UNM
FORM DomN NAME DrspuTE RESOLUFION Poucy, at http://www.icann.org/udrp/
udrp-rules-24oct99.htm (last modified Jan. 3, 2000) [hereinafter UDRP RULES].
4 See INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS, TIMELINE FOR
THE FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNIFORM DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE Rrs-
OLUTION PoLcY, at http://-wv.icann.org/udrp/udrp-schedule.htm (last modified
July 27, 2000) [hereinafter UDRP TIMELINE]. The UDRP was available as early as
December 1, 1999 to resolve disputes arising from domain names registered through
a select group of registrars receiving early accreditation from ICANN. See id.
5 See UDRP, supra note 2, 1.
6 See INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAmES AND NUMBERS, FREQUENTLY
ASKED QUESTIONS (FAQ), at http://www.icann.org/general/faql.htm#udrp (last
modified Sept. 13, 1999) thereinafter ICANN FAQ].
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squatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) 7 as part of a consolidated
appropriations bill.8 The Act amends the Federal Trademark Act of
1946 (the Lanham Act)9 to specifically prohibit cybersquatting' o and
provides an option for statutory damages of $1000 to $100,000 per
domain name in place of actual damages."
This Note surveys both ICANN's UDRP and the ACPA and the
likely implications of both policies for trademark owners and domain
name holders.12 Part I discusses ICANN and the domain name system
and explains both the procedural and substantive aspects of the
UDRP. Part II first explains federal trademark law as it applied to
7 Pub. L. No. 106-113, app. I, tit. I, 1999 U.S.C.C.A.N. (113 Stat.) 1501A-545
(to be codified primarily at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)).
8 Pub. L. No. 106-113, 1999 U.S.C.CA.N. (113 Stat.) 1501 ("An Act Making con-
solidated appropriations for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2000, and for other
purposes."); see Statement on Signing Consolidated Appropriations Legislation for
Fiscal Year 2000, 35 WEEKLY CoMP. PRus. Doc. 2458 (Nov. 29, 1999).
9 Federal Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (1994).
10 SeeAnticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125 (d) (1) (A)
(West Supp. 2000).
11 See id. § 1117(d).
12 The UDRP and the ACPA have already generated a substantial amount of
scholarship. For additional discussion of the UDRP, see generally M. Scott Donahey
& Ryan S. Hilbert, World Wrestling Federation Entertainment, Inc. v. Michael Bos-
man: A Legal Body Slam for Cybersquatters on the Wb, 16 S Nr, CL,R. COMPuTER & HIGH
TEcH. L.J. 421 (2000) (discussing the first case resolved by an administrative panel
under the UDRP); Olivia Maria Baratta & Dana L. Hanaman, Note, A Global Update on
the Domain Name System and the Law: Alternative Dispute Resolution for Increasing Internet
Competition-Oh, the Times They are a-Changin, 8 TULJ. INT'L & Cow. L 325 (2000)
(discussing the emergence of ICANN and the UDRP and comparing the UDRP with
pre-ACPA trademark law); Kevin Eng, Note, Breaking Through the Looking Glass: An
Analysis in Trademark Rights in Domain Names Across Top Letiel Domains, 6 B.U.J. Sc. &
TEcH. L. 7, 1 40-53 (CD-ROM, June 1, 2000) (comparing the UDRP to Network
Solutions, Inc.'s former Dispute Resolution Policy); Luke A. Walker, Note, IC4N's
Uniform Domain NameDispute Resolution Polity, 15 BERE.EY TECH. LJ. 289 (2000) (ana-
lyzing and favorably reviewing the UDRP). For additional comprehensive treatment
of the ACPA, see Gregory B. Blasbalg, Note, Masters of TheirDomains: Trademark Holders
Now Have New Ways to Control Their Afarks in Cyberspace 5 ROGER Wu.uLL-s U. L R%-.
563 (2000); Elizabeth Robison Martin, Note, "Too Famous to Live Long: The Anticber-
squatting Consumer Protection Act Sets its Sites to Eliminate Cybersquatter Opportunistic Claims
on Domain Names, 31 ST. MARY'S L.J. 797 (2000); Neil L. Martin, Note, The Antic)ber-
squatting Consumer Protection Act: Empowering Trademark Owners, but Not the Last Wird on
Domain Name Disputes, 25J. CoRP. L. 591 (2000); Aaron L Melville, Legal Update, New
Cybersquatting Law Brings Mixed Reaction From Trademark Owners, 6 B.U.J. Soi. & TECH.
L. 13 (CD-ROM, June 1, 2000). While the UDRP and the ACPA have individually
served as topics for a number of notes and articles, it is my hope that this Note con-
tributes to legal scholarship by presenting a comprehensive analysis and comparison
of both the UDRP and the ACPA.
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cybersquatting disputes before the ACPA. Part II then proceeds to
analyze the new ACPA and to highlight the changes to federal trade-
mark law it makes. Part III compares the UDRP with the AGPA and
discusses the choice that trademark owners have between the policies
and some of the problems that may arise from both. Part III.A con.
cludes that trademark owners seeking fast and inexpensive retrieval of
domain names from cybersquatters will overwhelmingly seek resolu-
tion through UDRP administrative proceedings and will litigate pi-
marily for purposes of seeking damages. Part III.B argues that
although the UDRP and, to a lesser extent, the ACPA probably pro-
vide adequate safeguards against "reverse domain name hijacking,"
additional action by ICANN and Congress may be necessary should it
ever become problematic. Part III.C then explains that while the
UDRP intentionally applies to a narrower range of domain name dis-
putes than the ACPA, its substantive provisions should not be viewed
as inconsistent with federal trademark law. Finally, Part IILD con-
cludes that while neither the UDRP nor the ACPA threaten noncom-
mercial speech on the Internet itself, both may impose some,
although probably reasonable, limits on a noncommercial speaker's
choice of domain names.
I. ICAN AND T UNIFORM DOMAIN NAME DIsPuTE
RESOLUTION POLICY
A. History of ICANN and the UDRP
ICANN is a private sector corporation formed in response to a
Department of Commerce White Paper'3 calling for the privatization of
technical coordination of the Domain Name System (DNS) formerly
performed under government contract. 14 Previously, the Internet As-
13 Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741 (Dep't of
Commerce June 4, 1998) ("White Paper"), available at http://vw.ntia.doc.gov/
ntiahome/domainname/6_5_98dns.htm.
14 See INrERm= CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAiFis AND NUMBERS, ICANN BACK.
GROUND, at http://-vw.icann.org/general/background.htm (last visited Sept. 22,
2000) [hereinafter ICANN BACKGROUND]; see also Management of Internet Names
and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. at 31,744-45 (detailing the government's plan to turn
over responsibility for managing the DNS to a new non-profit corporation); 4 McCAR.
=y, supra note 1, § 25:73.1 (discussing the transfer of DNS management responsibil-
ity to ICANN);Joseph P. Liu, Legitimacy and Authority in Internet Coordination: A Domain
Name Case Study, 74 IND. LJ. 587, 601-04 (1999) (discussing ICANN's creation as an
international non-profit organization in response to the Department of Commerce
Green Paper and subsequent White Paper). The government had previously reserved
use of the Internet for military and educational purposes until 1992 when Congress
authorized the National Science Foundation (NSF) to allow commercial activity on
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signed Numbers Authority (IANA) coordinated under government
contract the assignment of Internet Protocol (IP) numbers that iden-
tify each computer on the Internet with a unique nine digit code (for
example, 11.22.33.4.55).15 The DNS translates these IP numbers into
easily recognizable names such as "wvw.nd.edu." Ir Top Level Do-
mains (TLDs), the last sequence of letters in a domain name, may be
either a country code such as ".us" or ".ca" or a non-geographically
oriented generic top level domain (gTLD) such as ".com" or ".edu." 17
While domain names in national TLD's are managed by their respec-
tive governments or private organizations, the gTLD's ".com," ".org,"
".net," and ".edu" have been registered exclusively by Network Solu-
tions, Inc. (NSI), a Virginia corporation, under agreement with the
National Science Foundation (NSF).18
In addition to assuming control over the allocation and manage-
ment of IP numbers (IANA's former function), ICANN is also respon-
sible for the DNS. 19 ICANN has recently accredited several competing
registrars to register gTLDs, thereby breaking NSI's previous monop-
oly °2 0 Thus, in its short history, ICANN has now become the "private,
not-for-profit corporation... manag[ing] the coordinated functions
[of the Internet] in a stable and open institutional framework" and
the NSFNET, the civilian portion of the Internet. SeeImprovement of Technical Man-
agement of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 8826, 8826 (Dep't of Com-
merce Feb. 20, 1998) ("Green Paper") ("From its origins as a U.S. based research
vehicle, the Internet is rapidly becoming an international medium for commerce,
education and communication."), available at http://,.v.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/
domainname/dnsdrft.htm; see also Scientific and Ad%anced-Technology Act of 1992,
42 U.S.C. § 1862(a) (1994) (authorizing commercial activity on the Internet), died in
Management of Interet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. at 31,742 n.5; Manage-
ment of Intemet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. at 31,742. Sregenerally Baratta &
Hanaman, supra note 12, at 336-46 (discussing the creation of ICANN and its new
role in managing the domain name system).
15 See Improvement of Technical Management of Internet Names and Addresses,
63 Fed. Reg. at 8826.
16 See id; see also Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. at
31,741 (explaining how the DNS translates IP numbers into 'familiar and easy-to-
remember names"); 4 MCARTy, supra note 1, § 25:72 (same). For a detailed discus-
sion of the mechanics and history of the domain name system, see Baratta &
Hanaman, supra note 12, at 330-46.
17 See 4 MCCARTm, supra note 1, § 25:72.
18 See Improvement of Technical Management of Internet Names and Addresses,
63 Fed. Reg. at 8826; 4 McCARTIw, supra note 1, § 25:73.
19 See ICANN BACKGROUND, supra note 14; 4 McQ nm; supra note 1, § 25:73.1.
20 See ICANN BAcKGROUND, supra note 14. For an updated list of ICANN-accred-
ited registrars, see Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, List of
Accredited and Accreditation-Qualzfied Registrars, at http://itw.icann.org/registr/rs/ac-
credited-list.html (last modified Sept. 21, 2000).
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has established a "system for registering second-level domains and the
management of the TLD registries [that is] competitive and market
driven"2' as envisioned by the Department of Commerce's January
1998 Green Paper22 and later prescribed in the more detailed White
Paper.2
3
Among ICANN's most controversial functions, and a focus of this
Note, is its UDRP, which requires mandatory administrative dispute
resolution for certain disputes between trademark owners and do-
main name holders.2 4 Adopted on August 26, 1999,25 the UDRP has
been available during the past year for mandatory use by administra-
tive panels to resolve cybersquatting disputes. Since its implementa-
tion, the UDRP has been enormously popular, with administrative
panels resolving over 2000 domain name disputes under the UDRP.26
The Dispute Resolution Policy is "uniform," since it is incorpo-
rated into the registration agreements of NSI and all other competing
accredited registrars.27 The UDRP now supplants28 NSI's Domain
21 Improvement of Technical Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63
Fed. Reg. at 8827-28.
22 Improvement of Technical Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63
Fed. Reg. 8826 (Dep't of Commerce Feb. 20, 1998) ("Green Paper").
23 See Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741,
31,744-46 (Dep't of Commerce June 4, 1998) (outlining the details of the non-profit
corporation proposed by the Green Paper); see also ICANN BACKcROUND, supra note 14
("The DOG's White Paper envisaged a 'global, consensus, non-profit corporation,' to
serve as the means by which DNS management could be privatized, enabling an open,
competitive system.").
24 See UDRP, supra note 2; see also Walker, supra note 12, at 299-302 (analyzing
the substance and procedure of the UDRP).
25 UDRP TimEUNE, supra note 4.
26 Administrative panels have resolved 2011 disputes as of September 27, 2000.
See Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, Statistical Summary of Pro
ceedings Under Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, at http://v.icann.org/
udrp/proceedings-stat.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2000). The full text of all decisions
reached under the UDRP are available online at Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers, List of Proceedings Under Unform Domain Name Dispute Resolution
Policy, at http://vw.icann.org/udrp/proceedings-list.htm (last visited Sept. 22,
2000) [hereinafter ICANN, List of Proceedings]. Although published on-line, these ad-
ministrative decisions lack mandatory precedential authority by virtue of the UDRP's
rules. See 4 McCARTHY, supra note 1, § 25:74.2 (citing UDRP Ruuts, supra note 3, 1
15(a) (stating ambiguously that "[a] Panel shall decide a complaint on the basis of
the statements and documents submitted and in accordance with the Policy, these
Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable")). Citations to
panel decisions in this Note do not necessarily illustrate the exclusive, or even prevail-
ing, interpretations of the UDRP's provisions, but rather illustrate examples of possible
interpretations. A full survey of these decisions is far beyond the scope of this Note.
27 See UDRP, supra note 2, 1.
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Name Dispute Policy29 which placed domain names "on hold" when a
complainant presented evidence of rights in a registered trademark
"identical to a... domain name," if the trademark was registered
before the domain name, and the domain name holder had no regis-
tered trademark rights in the domain name.3 0 NSI's policy inherently
conflicted with federal trademark law,31 since it permitted infringing
and dilutive uses of non-identical domain names32 while it suspended
domain names that were non-infringing and non-dilutive yet identical
to registered trademarks.33 NSI's policy also provided successful com-
28 See iL at n.2 ("This policy has been adopted by all accredited domain name
registrars for domain names ending in .com, .net, and .org." (emphasis added)).
29 See NErWoRK SoLUTIONS, INC., NErwou SoLrnoxs' Do,,LuN NMIUE DiswLr
Poucy (Rev. 03, Feb. 25, 1998) (on file with the Notre Dame Law Reiw), available at
http://cmcnyls.edu/misc/NSIDNRP3.HTM [hereinafter NSI Poucy'. &e generally
Eng, supra note 12, 1 40-53 (comparing in detail the UDRP with NSI's old dispute
resolution policy); DomAN MAGISTRATE FiO.M NEm-1OR SOLLMONs, FREQu&-N-MY
AsKED QUESTIONS, at http://vvv.domainmagistrate.com/faqs.html#2 (last visited
Aug. 31, 2000) (summarizing differences between the NSI Policy and the UDRP).
30 NSI Poucy, supra note 29, 8(a), 9.
31 See infra Part IIA for a complete treatment of trademark infringement and
dilution in the context of domain name disputes.
32 SeeJennifer Golinveaux, ltzt's in a Domain Name: Is Cybersquatting" Trademark
Dilution?, 33 U.S.F. L. REv. 641, 646 (1999) ("NSI's requirement that the infringing
name be 'identical' differs from the requirements to show either trademark infringe-
ment or dilution. Exact similarity between the competing marks is not required to
show trademark infringement. It is sufficient that the marks be similar enough that
they are likely to confuse the public." (citations omitted)). Thaus, NSI's policy vas
presumedly of no avail to Toys "R" Us, Inc., who received an injunction against a
cybersquatter's use of "wwwv.to)sareus.com." Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Abir, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1944, 1949 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). Although this domain name is not identical to
"Toys 'R' Us," the court found it infringed upon and diluted the plaintiff's trademark.
See id at 1948.
Other commentators have criticized NSI for contributing to the problem of
cybersquatting by offering an after-the-fact dispute resolution s)stem instead of evalu-
ating "[up front] whether that registration or use may infringe upon the rights of a
third party." Developments in the Law-The Law, of Cyberspace, 112 HRtv. L RE%. 1574,
1664 (1999) [hereinafter The Law of Cyberspace] (quoting NSI Poucy', supra note 29, 1
1) (alteration in original); see also Liu, supra note 14, at 606-07 (crticiAng NSI's "first-
come, first-served allocation process" and the litigation to which it has given rise).
While ICANN does not evaluate the compliance of domain names ith trademark
laws at the time of registration, the UDRP does require that domain name registrants
warrant that to their knowledge "the registration of the domain name will not in-
fringe upon or otherwise violate the rights of any third party" and states that "[i]t is
your responsibility to determine whether your domain name registration infringes or
violates someone else's rights." UDRP, supra note 2, 12.
33 While NSI's policy narrowly applied only to domain names "identical" to a
complainant's registered trademark, it granted broad protection to this narrow class
of complainants by not requiring a showing of infringement or dilution. &e Lock-
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plainants with an incomplete remedy to cybersquatting disputes, since
they had to litigate, submit to arbitration, or privately settle to seek
transfer or permanent cancellation of a domain name.34
The UDRP, which constitutes in the words of one commentator
"a vast improvement" over NSI's policy,3 5 arose from recommenda-
tions solicited by the Department of Commerce from the World Intel-
lectual Property Organization (WIPO).36 While the Department of
Commerce, in light of the shortcomings of NSI's policy, emphasized
the necessity of "on-line dispute resolution [to] provide an inexpen-
sive and efficient alternative to litigation for resolving disputes be-
tween trademark owners and domain name registrants," 37 the
Government also insisted that the administrative procedure should
only apply to instances of cybersquatting and should not attempt to
resolve disputes between "legitimate competing rights."38  Thus,
ICANN's UDRP may have applied against Dennis Toeppen, the infa-
heed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 953 (C.D. Cal. 1997),
affld, 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999) ("NSI's policy has been criticized as favoring [na-
tionally registered] trademark owners over domain name holders... because owners
of federally registered marks can invoke NSI's policy to effectively enjoin the use of
identical domain names without having to make any showing of infringement or dilu-
tion."). The lack of an infringement or dilution requirement has led, as some com-
mentators observed, to the practice of "reverse domain name hijacking," where
trademark holders attempt to seize a domain name corresponding to their trademark
from a legitimate, non-infringing user. See Carl Oppedahl, Recent Cases Examine Reverse
Domain Name Hijacking, 21 HAmrGs Comm!. & Err. LJ. 535, 536-44 (1999); Rebecca
W. Gole, Note, Playing the Name Game: A Glimpse at the Future of the Internet Domain
Name System, 51 FED. Co M. LJ. 403, 412 (1999) (defining reverse domain name
hijacking).
34 See NSI PoucY, supra note 29, § 9(f). NSI's only remedy was to place the dis-
puted domain name on hold until the parties independently resolved the dispute. See
id. § 9(d).
35 Eng, supra note 12, 50 (calling the UDRP a 'vast improvement" over NSI's
former policy since it (1) "allow[s] for alternative means of resolution;" (2) "extends
actionable disputes to domain names that are confusingly similar, not just ones that
are identical to a trademark;" (3) "protects potentially good faith domain name regis-
trants by eliminating NSI's previous practice of placing domain names on hold sut-
tus;" and (4) "suggests a safe harbor for non-commercial uses").
36 See Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741, 31,747
(Dep't of Commerce June 4, 1998). See generally WORLD INTrrLE AL PROPFXTY OR.
GANIZATION, FINAL REPORT OF THE WIPO INTERNET DOMAIN NAME PROCESS, at http://
wipo2.ipo.int/processl/report/finalreport.html (Apr. 30, 1999), cited in ICANN
FAQ. supra note 6 (stating that general principles of WIPO's recommendations are
embodied in ICANN's dispute resolution policy).
37 Improvement of Technical Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63
Fed. Reg. 8826, 8830 (Dep't of Commerce Feb. 20, 1998).
38 Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. at 31,747.
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mous cybersquatter who registered for resale at profit approximately
240 domain names of famous trademarks such as "deltaairlines.com,"
"eddiebauer.com," and "unionpacific.com."3 9 The UDRP does not,
however, attempt to resolve disputes between concurrent uses of the
same trademark in which each owner holds legitimate rights (for ex-
ample, a hypothetical dispute between United Airlines, the D.C.
United Soccer Team, and United Artists for "www.united.comr"). 0
B. Mechanics of the UDRP
To begin proceedings against a cybersquatter under the UDRP,
the complainant first submits a complaint to one of several approved
administrative dispute resolution providers. 4' The complainant must
elect in the complaint whether the dispute will be resolved by a one or
three person panel.42 Complainants preferring a three person panel
also submit a list of three candidates for one position on the panel. 43
If either the complainant or the respondent prefers a three person
panel, the dispute will be settled by a three person panel.44 However,
39 Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1230 (N.D. Ill. 1996); see also
Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1300 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (listing
domain names registered by Toeppen), aftd, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998); 4 McCR.
"rn, supra note 1, § 25:77 (discussing the Toeppen cases); Leslie F. Brown, Case Note,
Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 14 BERKTiE TEcH. LJ. 247, 251-54 (1999)
(same).
40 See &g., Liu, supra note 14, at 606 (discussing the exclusivity of domain names).
While trademark law permits concurrent uses which do not cause confusion or dilu-
don, the domain name system permits only one person to register and use each possi-
ble domain name. See id "[B]oth Apple Records and Apple Computer can share
the same 'Apple' mark. There can be, however, only one apple.com." Id.; see also
MIcHAEL EPSrEIN, EPSrEIN ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERy § 12.02[D] [1] (4th ed. 1999)
(discussing the exclusive nature of domain names); Deborah Howitt, Note, Wr.rom:
Why the Battles OverDomain Names 117l Never Cease 19 HASTN-Gs Comm. & ENT. LJ. 719,
733 (1997) (discussing how the American Broadcasting Company was unable initially
to register "www.abccom," since it had previously been registered by ABC Design in
Seattle). The UDRP (or most likely federal trademark law) would not have been avail-
able to resolve the ABC dispute, since both ABCs had legitimate rights in the
"abc.com" domain name.
41 See UDRP RULEs, supra note 3, 3(a). A list of approved providers is available
at Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, Approved Pfoviders for Uni-
form Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, at http://ww ,%.icann.org/udrp/approved-
providers.htm (last modified May 21, 2000) [hereinafter ICANN Approved Providers].
ICANN itself assumes no role in the actual proceedings. &eUDRP, supra note 2, 1 4h.
42 See UDRP RULEs, supra note 3, 3(b) (iv).
43 See i.
44 See iaL 5(b) (iv). When a three person panel is called for by either party, the
respondent also has the privilege to submit the names of three possible candidates for
one position on the panel. See id. I 5(c).
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if the respondent elects in the response a three person panel after the
complainant expresses preference for a one person panel, the respon-
dent will be responsible for fifty percent of the fees associated with an
extended panel.45
Substantively, the complaint must plead:
(1) the manner in which the domain name(s) is/are identical or
confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the
Complainant has rights; and (2) why the Respondent (domain-
name holder) should be considered as having no rights or legiti-
mate interests in respect of the domain names(s) that is/are the
subject of the complaint; and (3) why the domain name(s) should
be considered as having been registered and being used in bad
faith.46
The UDRP sets forth four enumerated circumstances that "in par-
ticular but without limitation... shall be evidence of the registration
and use of a domain name in bad faith., 47 These circumstances in-
clude acquisition or registration "primarily for the purpose of selling,
renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to
the complainant.., for valuable consideration in excess of... out of
pocket costs;" 48 registration "in order to prevent the owner of the
trademark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain
name;" 49 registration "primarily for the purpose of disrupting the bus-
iness of a competitor;"50 and use of the domain name with the intent
to "attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to your web site or
other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the
complainant's mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or en-
dorsement of [their] web site .... ."51
After receiving the complaint, the administrative dispute resolu-
tion provider forwards the complaint to the respondent,52 who then
45 See id. 5(c).
46 Id. 3(b) (ix); see also UDRP, supra note 2, 4a. The UDRP states that respon-
dents must submit to mandatory administrative proceedings whenever a complainant
submits a complaint to a dispute resolution service provider alleging that their "do-
main name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the
complainant has rights"; that they "have no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the
domain name"; and that the disputed "domain name has been registered and is being
used in bad faith." Id. 4a(i)-(iii) (emphasis added).





52 See UDRP RULES, supra note 3, 4(a).
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has twenty days53 to "[rlespond specifically to the statements and alle-
gations contained in the complaint and include any and all bases for
the Respondent (domain-name holder) to retain registration and use
of the disputed domain name .... ."54 The respondent may demon-
strate legitimate rights in the domain name sufficient to rebut the
complainant's allegation of bad faith by showing "in particular but
without limitation"55 that respondent used or prepared to use the do-
main name "in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or ser-
vices" prior to receiving notice of the dispute,56 that respondent has
been "commonly known by the domain name,"5 7 or that respondent is
"making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name,
without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers
or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue."5
After receiving the response, the administrative panel will then
decide the dispute "on the basis of the statements and documents sub-
mitted and in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rudes
and principles of law that it deems applcable."r,9 The dispute resolution
service provider will then notify the parties, the registrar, and IGANN
of the decision reached.60 Upon receipt of notification, ICANN will
wait ten days before canceling any domain name pursuant to the ad-
ministrative decision.61 If within this ten day period ICANN receives
documentation that a lawsuit has been commenced against the com-
plainant concerning ownership and use of the domain name, it will
wait until the lawsuit is dismissed or resolved before taking further
action.62 In this event, ICANN will ultimately implement the decision
of a court regarding ownership of the domain name.
63
53 Seei U 5(a).
54 Id. 5 (b) (i).
55 UDRP, supra note 2, 4c (emphasis added).
56 Id. 4c(i).
57 Id- [ 4c(ii).
58 Id. 4c(iii).
59 UDRP RULES, supra note 3, 15(a) (emphasis added). To determine, for in-
stance, what constitutes "confusingly similar" or "tarnishment," administrative panels
could refer to state, federal, foreign, or international principles of intellectual prop-
erty law as they deem applicable in their discretion. See infra note 77.
60 See UDRP RULEs, supra note 3, 16(a).
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II. FEDERAL TRADEiARK LAW AND CYBERSQUATrING
Until the recent implementation of the UDRP, a company seek-
ing to reclaim a domain name registered by a cybersquatter generally
had to offer a settlement 64 or pursue potentially lengthy and costly
litigation.65 With the advent of the UDRP, courts and federal trade-
mark law66 are no longer the only compulsory
67 and complete6 8
sources of relief available for trademark owners who have fallen prey
to cybersquatters. Nonetheless, the UDRP will not undermine the im-
64 Trademark owners often pay significant sums to cybersquatters (who perversely
own no rights whatsoever in the trademark) in exchange for domain names to avoid
the hassle or potentially greater expense of litigation. See, e.g., 145 CONG. REc. S7334
(daily ed. June 21, 1999) (statement of Sen. Abraham) (stating that Gateway Corp.
paid $100,000 to a cybersquatter placing an adult web-site at "www.gateway2000.
corn"); Brown, supra note 39, at 251 ("Cybersquatters operate under the assumption
that it is cheaper for the trademark holder to pay them to hand over the domain
name than it is for the holder to litigate."); Patrick McGeehan & Matt Richtel, Wat's
in a Web Address? Maybe a Lawsuit, N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 22, 1999, at Al, C6 (reporting that
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Company offered a seventeen-year-old domain name
registrant $10,000, but refused demands of $75,000 and $50,000 for the domain name
"www.msdw.com").
65 See NSI PoLicY, supra note 29; supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the inadequate relief provided by NSI's former policy).
66 While trademark holders can also recover under state causes of action (state
unfair competition and dilution law), see, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 40, § 12.02[D] [1],
or foreign intellectual property law where jurisdiction permits, see, e.g., Heinz Goddar
and Axel Nordemann, European Protection Strategies for the Internet, in INtELaErt, AL
PROPERTY FOR THE INTERNTr 213, 231-32 (Lewis C. Lee &J. Scott Davidson eds., 1997)
(surveying German courts' protection of trademarks registered as domain names),
this Note will limit its discussion, for the sake of simplicity, to applicable principles of
federal trademark law.
67 Before the UDRP, trademark holders, like parties to any other dispute, could
avoid litigation and seek expedited relief through various means of alternative dispute
resolution (ADR). See, e.g., The Law of Cyberspace, supra note 32, at 1665 (noting that
private companies offered domain name dispute resolution services in response to
NSI's shortcomings). However, unlike conventional forms of ADR, the UDRP is com-
pulsory and does not require the consent of the respondent/cybersquatter. See
UDRP, supra note 2, 4 (stating that respondent must submit to a "mandatory admin-
istrative proceeding" for resolution of applicable domain name disputes (emphasis
added)).,
68 Unlike NSI's policy, the UDRP empowers ICANN to cancel respondent's do-
main name altogether (as would be appropriate in a case where the disputed domain
name tarnishes the complainant's trademark but is otherwise of no utility to the com-
plainant) or to transfer the respondent's domain name directly to the complainant
upon receipt of an administrative decision. See UDRP, supra note 2, 3c. Cancella-
tion and transfer of domain names are, however, the only remedies available from the
administrative proceedings. See id. 4i.
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portance of trademark law to domain name disputes, nor will it proba-
bly eliminate or substantially reduce litigation.
As intended by the Commerce Department, the UDRP applies
only to cybersquatting and similar abusive forms of domain name re-
gistration.69 Many domain name trademark disputes will not, for this
reason, fall under the subject matter jurisdiction of the UDRP's ad-
ministrative panels.70 Even in cases of cybersquatting covered by the
UDRP, a complainant seeking damages or injunctive relief (besides an
injunction against using the domain name) must still file suit against
the domain name holder since the UDRP's remedies are limited to
cancellation and transfer of the domain name.7 ' Furthermore, the
ACPA72 will most likely encourage litigation and keep federal trade-
mark law at the forefront of many domain name disputes.73 This pow-
erful new weapon of trademark holders-which offers statutory
damages of up to $100,000 per domain name74-combined with the
69 Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741, 31,746
(Dep't of Commerce June 4, 1998); see also ICANN FAQ, supra note 6 (noting that
domain name registrars generally have no authority to cancel domain names except
at the direction of a court or arbitration decision; calling the UDRP's application to
"abusive attempts to profit from another's trademark" an exception to this general
rule); A. Michael Froomkin, Comments on ICANN Uniform Dispute Polity: A Catalog of
Critical Process Failure" Progress on Substance; Afore Work Neerded, at http://
ivww.law.miami.edu/-amf/icann-udp.htm (Oct. 13, 1999) (explaining the unsuitabil-
ity of the UDRP to resolve disputes more fact-intensive than those involving "cyber-
squatting and grossly unfair competition") ("Any fact-rich case and especially one
where there are complex credibility issues belong in court or in a more traditional
arbitration where parties can be heard directly.").
70 For example, a complainant who alleges that the respondent's domain name is
"confusingly similar" to its trademark will find the UDRP of no avail, if the respondent
is using or preparing to use the domain name "in connection ith a bona fide offer-
ing of goods or services." UDRP, supra note 2, 1 4a(i), 4c(i). The complainant, in
this circumstance, will lose under a UDRP administrative hearing, even if the offering
of goods itself constitutes an egregious violation of the complainant's trademark
rights. See International Trademark Association (INTA), IrTA Response to Draft UDRP,
Accompanying Rules, and Provider Selection, at http://wv.icann.org/comments-mail/
comment-udrp/current/msgOO05O.html (Oct. 7, 1999) (noting that a showing of use
or preparation to use a domain name in connection with an offering of goods does
not establish that person's legal right to use the domain name).
71 See UDRP, supra note 2, 4i.
72 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d) (West Supp. 2000).
73 The first lawsuit under the ACPA was filed just three da)s after the President
signed the Act into law. See Ritchenya A. Shepard, Cyberpirates Now May Have to Eat
the Plank, NAT'L LJ., Dec. 20, 1999, at B18 (discussing actor Brad Pitt's lawsuit under
the act to recover the domain name "bradpitt.com" from cybersquatters).
74 15 U.S.C.A. § 1117(d) (West Supp. 2000).
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inherent limitations of the UDRP, should keep federal court dockets
busy hearing domain name disputes for years to come.
A grasp of federal trademark law is also essential for the com-
plainant seeking cancellation or transfer of a domain name held by a
cybersquatter and nothing else. First, UDRP administrative panels
may consider, during their deliberations, "any rules and principles of
law that [they] deem[ ] applicable." 75 Given the historic and contin-
ued dominance of United States entities on the Internet, 76 parties to
administrative dispute resolution should not be surprised if panelists
apply principles of federal trademark law to interpret ambiguous pro-
visions of the UDRP.77 Second, the UDRP permits a domain name
holder to appeal a decision of an administrative panel by filing suit in
a court of competent jurisdiction within ten days.78 Complainants
seeking resolution of cybersquatting disputes through the simple and
cost-effective procedures of the UDRP may still find themselves having
to prove their case against the domain name holder in a federal court.
Given the continued-if not growing-importance of federal trade-
mark law and its relationship to the UDRP, this Part will survey the
'Federal Trademark Act of 1946, the Federal Trademark Dilution Act
of 1995,79 the ACPA, and the causes of action these statutes provide
against domain name holders.
75 UDRP RULES, supra note 3, 15(a).
76 See generally Improvement of Technical Management of Internet Names and
Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 8826 (Dep't of Commerce Feb. 20, 1998) ("Green Paper");
Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741 (Dep't of Corn-
merce June 4, 1998) ("White Paper").
77 See, e.g., World Wrestling Fed'n Entr't, Inc. v. Bosman, WIPO, No. D99-0001,
6, at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/d99-0001.html (Jan. 14, 2000)
(Donahey, Arb.) (citing Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1325 (9th
Cir. 1998), to show that the respondent's offer to sell the disputed domain name to
the complainant at a profit was "use" of the domain name, and Intermatic, Inc. v.
Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1239 (N.D. Ill. 1996), to show that such an offer to sell
was a "commercial use"), discussed in Donahey & Hilbert, supra note 12, 423-24 n.17.
(M. Scott Dohaney was the panelist deciding the World Wrestling Federation Entertain-
ment case.)
"[A]Ithough it was unnecessary to consider the laws of the United States in ren-
dering a decision, because both of the parties were domiciled in the United States,
and United States courts had had recent experience in dealing with similar disputes,
the arbitrator looked to these cases for assistance." Donahey & Hilbert, supra note 12,
at 424 n.17; see also InfoSpace.com, Inc. v. Delighters, Inc., WIPO, No. D2000-0068,
6A, at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/d2000-OO68.html (May 1,
2000) (Partridge, Arb.) (citing N. Light Tech., Inc. v. N. Lights Club, 97 F. Supp. 2d
96 (D. Mass. 2000) (consulting a district court's interpretation of "confusingly similar"
under the ACPA to interpret "confusingly similar" under UDRP 4c(i))).
78 See UDRP, supra note 2, 4k.
79 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Supp. IV 1998).
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A. The Federal Trademark Act of 1946 (the Lanham Act) and the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995
The Federal Trademark Act of 1946, commonly known as the
Lanham Act, provides for a civil cause of action against persons who
"use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imi-
tation of a registered mark in connection with ... goods or services on or
in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive. ..."80 The Lanham Act also covers unlaw-
ful uses of a registered trademark in connection with marketing activi-
ties.81  A separate provision, § 1125(a), provides owners of
unregistered marks with a cause of action for unfair competition
against persons who "in connection with any goods and services...
use[] in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device... which
.. is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to
the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another
person .... 8 2 These original sections of the Lanham Act have been
of limited use to trademark owners, since cybersquatters usually do
not use their domain names in connection with goods or services nor
do they generally cause confusion to consumers.
83
The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 amended the Lan-
ham Act to provide a cause of action for dilution, or the "lessening of
the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or
services, regardless of the presence or absence of-(1) competition
between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2) likeli-
hood of confusion, mistake, or deception."8 4 The Dilution Act enti-
ties an "owner of a famous mark"85 to an injunction (damages are also
80 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
81 See id. § 1114(1) (b).
82 Id. § 1125(a)(1).
83 See Golinveaux, supra note 32, at 641 ("Because the cybersquatter often does
not make any significant use of the site once it is reserved, it can be difficult to show
the likelihood of confusion necessary for a successful trademark infringement case.");
see also 4 McCATmr, supra note 1, § 25:76 ("[N]either merely reserving a domain
name nor use of a domain name solely to indicate a site on the Internet, in and of
itself, constitutes 'goods or services' in the Lanham Act sense. Rather, one must con-
sider the content of the site identified by the domain name.").
84 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (Supp. IV 1998). See EPsm!,r, supra note 40,
§ 12.02[D] [3] [a] [i], for a discussion of dilution by blurring and tamishment under
§ 1127.
85 The Dilution Act provides an inexhaustive list of factors a court may consider
when determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous:
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark-
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the
goods and services with which the mark is used;
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available if dilution was willful) 86 "against another person's commercial
use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after the
mark has become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality
of the mark .... ",87
The Dilution Act is limited to commercial dilution both through
its express and single application to "commercial use" and through
express exceptions in the Act for "[f] air use of a famous mark by an-
other person in comparative commercial advertising or promotion,"
"[noncommercial uses of a mark," and "[a]ll forms of news reporting
and news commentary."88
Prior to the recent passage of the ACPA, the Dilution Act has
provided trademark owners' primary cause of action against cyber-
squatters.89 Although the Dilution Act does not expressly refer to
cybersquatting or domain names, its legislative history indicates that at
least one legislator, Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont, intended di-
rect application of the Act to cybersquatting disputes.
Although no one else has yet considered this application, it is my
hope that this antidilution statute can help stem the use of decep-
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark;
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used;
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is
used;
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and chan-
nels of trade used by the marks' owner and the person against whom
the injunction is sought;
(G) the nature and extent of the use of the same or similar marks by third
parties; and
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the
Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1). See generally Christopher R. Perry, Note, Trademarks as Com-
modities: The "Famous" Roadblock to Applying Trademark Dilution Law in Cyberspace, 32
CONN. L. REv. 1127 (2000) (discussing courts' recent interpretation of the Dilution
Act's "famous" requirement in the context of cybersquatting cases).
86 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2).
87 Id. § 1125(c) (1) (emphasis added).
88 ld. § 1125(c) (4) (emphasis added); see 141 CoNG. REc. S19,310 (daily ed. Dec.
29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("The bill will not prohibit or threaten noncom-
mercial expression, such as parody, satire, editorial and other forms of expression
that are not a part of a commercial transaction."); 4 McCARTw, supra note 1, § 25:76
("While the statute does not require that there be advertising or a sale of goods or
services, 'commercial use' implies a place where some business is carried on or goods
or services are sold, distributed or advertised for sale.").
89 See EPSTEIN, supra note 40, § 12.02[D] [1].
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tive Internet addresses taken by those who are choosing marks that
are associated with the products and reputations of others.
90
Consistent with Senator Leahy's (and trademark owners') desires,
courts have interpreted the Dilution Act and its "commercial use in
commerce" and "dilution" requirements broadly enough to enjoin
many instances of cybersquatting.91 Courts have held that essentially
any use of the Internet satisfies the "in commerce" requirement. 92 In
Panavision Internationa4 L.P. v. Toeppen, the court declared that since
the Lanham Act defines commerce as "all commerce which may law-
fully be regulated by Congress," a cybersquatter's registration of the
plaintiff's trademark with intent to sell to the plaintiff at a profit was
"clearly commerce within this definition."9 3 Courts have further held
that a cybersquatter's "intention to arbitrage" the domain name-to
resell to the trademark owner at a profit-is a "commercial use."9
Courts have made clear, however, that registration of a domain name
without further action 95 and the mere infliction of financial loss on a
90 141 CONG. REc. S19,312 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Leahy),
quoted in Golinveaux, supra note 32, at 666-67. But see Golinveaux, supra note 32, at
667 ("It is not dear, however, that Senator 4lahy's remarks apply to cybersquatting.
When he refers to 'deceptive Internet addresses' this could only mean 'deceptive' to
consumers. Because the cybersquatter makes no use of the Web site, there would
appear to be no deception of consumers.").
91 See generally Golinveaux, supra note 32 (discussing use of the Dilution Act to
enjoin cybersquatting); Brown, supra note 39 (same).
92 See, e.g. Panavision Int'l, LP. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1303 (C.D. Cal.
1996), afl'd, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
93 Id- at 1303 n.5 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (Supp. IV 1998)); see also 2 JERo.tE
GELSON, TRADEiARK PROTECrION AND PRAr'cE § 5.11[2], at 5-233 (2000) ("Because
Internet communications transmit instantaneously on a worldwide basis, there is little
question that the 'in commerce' requirement would be met in a typical Internet mes-
sage, be it trademark infringement or false advertising."), quoted in Intermatic, Inc. Y.
Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1239 (N.D. IlM. 1996).
94 See, eg., Intennatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1239 ("Toeppen's intention to arbitrage the
'intermatic.com' domain name constitutes a commercial use.... Toeppen's desire to
resell the domain name is sufficient to meet the 'commercial use' requirement of the
Lanham Act."); Panavision, 945 F. Supp. at 1303 ("Toeppen's 'business' [thus his com-
mercial use] is to register trademarks as domain names and then to sell the domain
names to the trademarks' owners."); Golinveaux, supra note 32, at 661, 661-66 (dis-
cussing cases "holding that intent to arbitrage marks constitutes 'commercial use'");
see also Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108
YALE LJ. 1687, 1701-02 (1999) (discussing the erosion of the "commercial use" re-
quirement in cybersquatting cases; citing the Toeppen cases as examples) ("[C]ourts
have had to stretch the 'commercial use in commerce' requirement to the vanishing
point in order to 'catch' cybersquatters.").
95 See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949,
959-60, af'd, 194 F.3d 980 (1999) (C.D. Cal. 1997) (holding that NSI cannot be held
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trademark owner 96 do not, for purposes of the Dilution Act, constitute
commercial use.
While courts "stretched" the meaning of "commercial use" to
"catch" cybersquatters,9 7 courts similarly developed a new category of
dilution, coined "dilution by elimination" by Jennifer Golinveaux, to
provide trademark owners with a cause of action against cybersquat-
ters under the Dilution Act.98 Cybersquatting is generally neither di-
lution by blurring,99 nor dilution by tarnishment, 100 the two black
letter categories of trademark dilution.10' As the Panavision court ex-
plained, cybersquatters do not "merely 'lessen[ ] the capacity of a fa-
mous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services,' but [rather]
eliminate the capacity of... [trademarks] to identify and distinguish
liable under the Dilution Act for registering an infringing domain name to a third
party, since the gravamen of "commercial use" in the Toeppen cases was a specific
intent to arbitrage, rather than impede use of, the domain name by the trademark
holder); Panavision, 945 F. Supp. at 1303 ("Registration of a trade [mark] as a domain
name, without more, is not a commercial use of the trademark and therefore is not
within the prohibitions of the Act."); 4 McCARmTw, supra note 1, § 25:76.
96 See Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1166 (C.D.
Cal. 1998) (holding that a site dedicated to consumer complaints about a business, a
seemingly non-commercial use of the plaintiff's trademark, did not become a com.
mercial use through its infliction of financial loss on the plaintifi).
97 Lemley, supra note 94, at 1702.
98 Golinveaux, supra note 32, at 657 (discussing the Panavision court's creation of
dilution by elimination).
99 For a discussion of dilution by blurring, see EPSTEIN, supra note 40,
§ 12.02 [D] [3] [a] [i]. See also Brown, supra note 39, at 250 (discussing dilution by blur-
ring) ("The harm occurs when a subsequent party (junior user') uses the same mark
on a different non-competing product or service, thereby creating in the consumer's
mind a new association with the mark. The original mark is blurred to the extent that
this new association decreases the mark's selling power."). For a discussion of the
inapplicability of dilution by blurring to cybersquatting cases, see Golinveaux, supra
note 32, at 657 ("The mere reservation of a trademark and attempt to sell it to the
trademark owner causes no blurring in the minds of the consumer.").
100 For a brief discussion of dilution by tamishment, see EPSTEIN, supra note 40,
§ 12.02 [D] [3] [a] [i]. For a discussion of the inapplicability of dilution by tamishment
to cybersquatting, see Golinveaux, supra note 32, at 656 ("[B]ecause the cybersquatter
makes no use or minimal use of the Web site after reserving the mark... there is no
opportunity for tarnishment."). But see Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Akkaoui, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1836, 1838 (N.D. Cal. 1996), cited in Golinveaux, supra note 32, at 656 (finding
that defendant's adult web-site, "adultsrus.com," tarnished plaintiff's trademark).
The Toys "R" Us domain name-trademark dispute, however, was not an instance of
pure cybersquatting since the defendant registered the domain name for his personal
business use without intent to resell to the plaintiff.
101 See EPS-EIN, supra note 40, § 12.02[D] [3] [a] [il; 4 McCATm, supra note 1,
§ 25:76.
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... goods and services on the Internet."10 2 A plaintiff seeking to re-
claim a trademark/domain name would therefore argue that the de-
fendant's registration of the domain name diluted the corresponding
trademark not by causing blurring in the minds of consumers nor by
presenting it in a negative light (dilution by tarnishment), but rather
by totally precluding its use as a domain name (and thus eliminating
the ability to use the domain name to market and distinguish goods
and services on the Intemet). 03 Thus, until the recent enactment of
the ACPA, a trademark owner's best chance to enjoin a cybersquatter
from use of a domain name was to sue under the Dilution Act and
argue that registration is "dilution by elimination"'0 4' and that "intent
to arbitrage" 10 5 is "commercial use in commerce."&
102 Panavision Int'l, LP. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1304 (C.D. Cal. 1996),
affd, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (Supp. 11' 1998)) (em-
phasis added); see also Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1240 (N.D. Ill.
1996) (same).
103 A recent Ninth Circuit decision placed limits on the "dilution by elimination"
doctrine, see Golinveaux, supra note 32, at 657, by holding that the defendant's regis-
tration of the plaintiff's marks in the ".net" rather than ".com" TLD did not entitle
the plaintiff to summary judgment, since such a registration would not cause a con-
sumer searching for the plaintiff's web-page (by typing "avery.com" or "averyden-
nison.com") to be diverted to the defendant's sites ("avery:net" and "dennison.net").
See Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 881 (9th Cir. 1999). Thus, the
court essentially held that the "dilution by elimination" doctrine only applies to eco-
nomically valuable domain names in the ".com" TLD. See id. The court also found
for the defendant on grounds that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that its
marks were "famous" as a matter of law under the Dilution Act. See id. at 876-77.
This decision reversed a lower court ruling that flatly found dilution and that granted
summary judgment for the plaintiff on grounds that "[i]t is the registration of the
trademark name as a domain name, which denies the holder of the famous trade-
mark from using its trademark name as an internet domain name, that dilutes the
ability to identify goods and services." Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 999 F.
Supp. 1337, 1341 (C.D. Cal. 1998), rev'd, 189 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 1999). &e generally
Kimberly A. O'Meara, Comment, Avery Dennison v. Sumpton: The Ninth Circuit Raises
the Barfor Successful Dilution Claims in Domain Name Cases, 20 Loy. LA. EN-r. L RE-. 61
(2000) (discussing how the Ninth Circuit's decision in At'er, Dennison narrows the
applicability of the Dilution Act to cybersquatting disputes).
104 Golinveaux, supra note 32, at 657. But see Atr ' Dennisou, 189 F.Sd at 880-81;
supra note 103.
105 Intenmatie, 947 F. Supp. at 1239.
106 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1998); see Golinveaux, supra note 32, at
661-66; Lemley, supra note 94, at 1701-02.
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B. The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999
1. Elimination of "Commercial Use in Commerce" and Dilution
Requirements
The ACPA amends the Lanham Act to explicitly provide trade-
mark owners with a civil cause of action against cybersquatters,
10 7
thereby eliminating trademark owners' reliance on cases liberally con-
struing the Dilution Act.'08 Although the White House reportedly op-
posed the legislation for its potential to undermine the UDRP,10 9
President Clinton nevertheless signed into law the consolidated ap-
propriations bill to which the ACPA was attached on November 29,
1999.110 The Act, in its principal part, provides:
A person shall be liable in a civil action by the owner of a mark,
including a personal name which is protected as a mark under this
section, if, without regard to the goods or services of the parties,
that person
(i) has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark, including a per-
sonal name which is protected as a mark under this section;
and
(ii) registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that-
(I) in the case of a mark that is distinctive at the time of regis-
tration of the domain name, is identical or confusingly
similar to that mark;
(II) in the case of a famous mark that is famous at the time of
registration of the domain name, is identical or confus-
ingly similar to or dilutive of that mark; or
(III) is a trademark, word, or name protected by reason of sec-
tion 706 of Title 18, United States Code, or section
220,506 of Tide 36."'1
Once a plaintiff shows a bad faith intent to profit from use of the
mark, 112 the plaintiff must then demonstrate that the defendant's do-
107 See 15 U.S.C.A § 1125(d)(1) (West Supp. 2000). The Act also provides for a
new in rem action against a domain name when the owner cannot be located or is not
subject to personal jurisdiction. See id. § 1125(d) (2).
108 See supra Part IIA.
109 SeeJeri Clausing, New Law Touches Off Suits Over Names in Cyberspace, N.Y. Ti1mEs,
Dec. 9, 1999, at C2 ("The law was... opposed by the Clinton administration, which
feared it would undermine attempts by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers, or Icann, to cut the number and cost of international lawsuits over
cybersquatting by consigning trademark-related disputes to arbitration.").
110 See Statement on Signing Consolidated Appropriations Legislation for Fiscal
Year 2000, 35 WEaEic Comp. PRs. Doc. 2458 (Nov. 29, 1999).
111 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d) (1) (A) (emphasis added).
112 See infra notes 126-61 and accompanying text.
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main name is "identical or confusingly similar" to a "distinctive" or
"famous" mark owned by the plaintiff,113 as would be necessary to re-
claim a domain name under a UDRP administrative hearing,1 4 or
that the domain name is dilutive of a famous mark,115 as is necessary
for a cause of action under the Dilution Act." 6 Unlike the Lanham
Act, the ACPA expressly excludes any requirement that the defendant
use the domain name in connection with "goods or services."" 7 And
unlike the Dilution Act, there is no requirement for "commercial use
in commerce,"" 8 eliminating the need for the judge-made concept of
"intent to arbitrage"1 9 as commercial use.12 0 The AGPA also elimi-
nates plaintiffs' need to rely on "dilution by elimination."' 2' While
case law creating and applying "dilution by elimination" is still availa-
ble to plaintiffs pleading dilution under the ACPA,'1 plaintiffs may
also prevail by instead showing that the defendant's domain name is
113 15 U.S.CA. § 1125(d) (1) (A) (ii) (I)-(H).
114 See UDRP, supra note 2, 4a.
115 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(I). For a discussion of a plaintiff's bur-
den in a dilution action to show that its mark is "famous," see supra note 85.
116 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1) (Supp. IV 1998). The Act also applies when a defen-
dan's domain name violates 18 U.S.C. § 706 (1994) (proscribing the unla%%ful wear-
ing or displaying the emblem of the Red Cross), or 36 U.S.C. § 220,506 (Supp. IV
1998) (proscribing unauthorized use of the symbol of the United States Olympic
Committee). See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125 (d) (1) (A) (ii) (III).
117 Compare 15 U.S.CA. § 1125 (d) (1) (A) (applying "without regard to the goods
or services of the parties"), with Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a)(1) (1994)
(requiring "connection with goods and services").
118 See Dilution Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1) (Supp. IV 1998) (requiring "commer-
cial use in commerce"). Although the ACPA contains no parallel provision to the
Dilution Act's requirement of "commercial use," courts may consider-when deter-
mining bad faith-the defendant's "bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the
mark." 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d) (1) (B) (i) (IV) (West Supp. 2000).
119 Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1239 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
120 See discussion supra Part ILA and note 94; see also Blasbalg, supra note 12, at
592-93 (arguing that the Act's elimination of a "use in commerce" requirement "con-
tinues a trend" in trademark law towards "protect(ing] the trademark itself" and away
from consumer protection (quoting Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316,
1325-26 (9th Cir. 1998), affd, 141 F.3d 1316 (9i Cir. 1998) (citing Boston Pro
Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., 510 F.2d 1004, 1011 (5ti Cir. 1975)))).
See generally Neil L Martin, supra note 12, at 603-04 (explaining how the ACPA's elim-
ination of a "commercial use" requirement makes clear that "[r]egistration [a]lone
[clan [g]ive [rlise [tlo [Iliability").
121 For a discussion of "dilution by elimination," see Golinveaux, supra note 32, at
657, and discussion supra Part 11A
122 No provision of the ACPA, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d) (West Supp. 2000). amends
the definition of dilution contained in the Dilution AcL See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (Supp.
IV 1998) (defining dilution). But see Neil L. Martin, supra note 12, at 602-03 (arguing
that the ACPA's bad faith requirement actually raises the standard for plaintiffs bring-
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"identical or confusingly similar" to their mark.12 3 Thus, had the
AGPA been available to the Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen and Panavision
plaintiffs,124 they could have prevailed by simply stating that the do-
main names "intermatic.com" and "panavision.com" are identical to
their trademarks, 25 without arguing that Toeppen's registration of
these domain names diluted the trademarks by eliminating their po-
tential use. The ACPA eliminates judge-made concepts of domain
name trademark infringement and dilution by covering through its
plain language the overwhelming majority of conceivable instances of
cybersquatting and bad faith domain name registration.
ing suit under a dilution theory, since its factors essentially require plaintiffs to show a
"likelihood of confusion").
123 15 U.S.CG.A § 1125 (d) (1) (A) (ii) (I)-(II). Neither the Lanham Act nor the Di-
lution Act provided a cause of action based on the fact that the defendant's domain
name was "identical" to the plaintiff's mark without also showing likelihood of confu-
sion, mistake or deceit, or causation of dilution. Although the Lanham Act provides
relief to plaintiffs proving that the defendant's use of their mark is "likely to cause
confusion," 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a)(1)(A) (1994), this is not the same as "con-
fusingly similar." "Likelihood of confusion" exists where "a reasonably prudent pur-
chaser is likely to be confused as to source, endorsement, affiliation, or sponsorship
between the plaintiff's and defendant's goods or services." EPSTEIN, supra note '40,
§ 7.03 [B] [2]. While "likelihood of confusion" centers on the possibility of consumer
confusion, see id., "confusingly similar" means confusion on the face-alphanumeric
similarity between the defendant's domain name and the plaintiff's trademark. See
Blasbalg, supra note 12, at 590 (differentiating "likelihood of confusion" from "confus-
ingly similar"). This definition of "confusingly similar" as alphanumeric similarity was
recently adopted by the district court in Northern Light Technology, Inc. v. Northern Lights
Club, 97 F. Supp. 2d 96, 117-18 (D. Mass. 2000). In Northern Light Technolog, the
district court held that by its "plain language," "confusingly similar" requires that
courts directly compare the plaintiff's trademark with the disputed domain name
rather than undertake a contextual comparison as is necessary for a finding of in-
fringement under the Lanham Act's "likelihood of confusion" test. Id. at 117-18.
The court also noted that the legislative history of the ACPA supports this interpreta-
tion of "confusingly similar," citing a House Report indicating that Congress intended
the Act to combat "domain name prospecting" rather than trademark infringement.
Id. at 117 (citing H.R. RE-. No. 106-412, at 6 (1999)). But see Neil L. Martin, supra
note 12, at 599-600 (using "likelihood of confusion" interchangeably with "confus-
ingly similar" and further arguing that the ACPA's "bad-faith inquiry is tantamount to
a likelihood of confusion analysis under an infringement action").
124 See supra notes 39, 92-94 and accompanying text.
125 See Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1232 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (stat-
ing that Toeppen had registered a domain name identical to the plaintiff's trade-
mark); Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1299 (C.D. Cal. 1996),
affd, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998) (same). These plaintiffs, of course, would also
have been required to prove Toeppen's "bad faith intent to profit." See 15 U.S.C.A,
§ 1125(d) (1) (B) (i).
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2. "Bad Faith Intent to Profit" Requirement
Although the ACPA facilitates lawsuits against cybersquatters by
eliminating the requirements of showing "commercial use in com-
merce" and "dilution," the plaintiff must still prove that the defendant
had a "bad faith intent to profit from that mark."12 6 Congress granted
courts broad discretion to determine bad faith by providing an in-
exhaustive list of factors a court may consider. 27 The Act states,
a court may consider factors such as, but not limited to:.
(I) the trademark or other intellectual property rights of the per-
son, if any, in the domain name;
(II) the extent to which the domain name consists of the legal
name of the person or a name that is othewise commonly used
to ident j that person;
(III) the person's prior use, if any, of the domain name in connec-
tion with the bona fide offering of any goods or services,
(IV) the person's bonafide noncommercial or fair use of the mark in
a site accessible under the domain name;
(V) the person's intent to divert consumers from die mark owner's
online location to a site accessible under the domain name
that could harm the goodwill represented by the mark, either
for commercial gain or with the intent to tarnish or disparage the
mark, by creating a likelihood of confusion as to die source,
sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the site;
(VI) the person's offer to transfer, sell or otherwise assign the domain
name to the mark owner or any third party forfinancial gain
without having used, or an intent to use, the domain name
in the bona fide offering of any goods or services, or the per-
son's prior conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct;
(VII) the person's provision of matenal and misleading false contact
information when applying for the registration of the domain
name, the person's intentional failure to maintain accurate
contact information, or the person's prior conduct indicat-
ing a pattern of such conduct;
(VIII) the person's registration or acquisition of multiple domain names
which the person knows are identical or confusingly similar to the
marks of others that are distinctive at the time of registration of
such domain names, without regard to the goods or services
of the parties; and
126 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i).
127 See id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(I)-(X). Congress granted similar discretion to
courts in the Dilution Act, which provided an inexhaustive list of non-dispositive fac-
tors to consider when determining whether a mark is famous. &ee 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(c)(1)(A)-(H) (Supp. IV. 1998).
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(IX) the extent to which the mark incorporated in the person's
domain name registration is or is not distinctive and famous
within the meaning of subsection (c) (1) of this section.128
In Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Market, Inc.129-a declaratory
action brought by Sporty's Farm L.L.C. seeking the right to continue
to use the domain name "sportys.com"' 0-the Second Circuit ap-
plied and interpreted this list of factors to find that the defendant had
registered the disputed domain name in bad faith.15 1 In Sporty's Farm,
Omega, a mail order company that was considering entering the avia-
tion catalog business in direct competition with Sportsman's Market,
registered the domain name "sportys.com," a variation of Sportsman's
"Sporty's" trademark. 3 2 Nine months later, Omega formed Sporty's
Farm L.L.C. as a wholly-owned subsidiary and sold it the domain
name, where the subsidiary hosted a web-site advertising its Christmas
tree business.' 33 Omega's CEO testified that he named the company
"Sporty's Farm" after a "childhood memory" of "Spotty's Farm"-the
farm where his uncle kept his dog "Spotty."
3 4
Despite this explanation, the Second Circuit found that Omega's
owners had registered "sportys.com" in bad faith and upheld the dis-
trict court's injunction ordering the transfer of the domain name.13-'
The court first noted that the domain name holder had no intellec-
tual property rights in "sportys.com," since it formed Sporty's Farm
L.L.C. after it registered the domain name. 3 6 The court therefore
limited the first factor of the bad faith checklist, which allows courts to
consider "the trademark or other intellectual property rights of the
person, if any, in the domain name,"'3 7 to rights that exist at the time
the domain name is registered.
128 15 U.S.CA § 1125(d) (1) (B) (i) (I)-(IX) (emphasis added). See generally Blas-
balg, supra note 12, at 569-74 (providing additional analysis of the Act's bad faith
factors); Neil L. Martin, supra note 12, at 599-603 (analyzing in detail the Act's bad
faith checklist and analogizing a court's inquiry under the list to a court's "likelihood
of confusion" inquiry in a trademark infringement action).
129 202 F.3d 489 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 2719 (2000). See generally
Elizabeth Robison Martin, supra note 12, at 833-37, for a complete review of Spory's
Farm.
130 See 202 F.3d at 494.
131 See id. at 498-99. This was the first federal appellate review of these factors.
132 See id. at 494.
133 See id.
134 Id.
135 See id. at 500.
136 See id. at 498 (applying 15 U.S.CA. § 1125(d) (1) (B) (i) (I) (West Supp. 2000)).
137 15 U.S.C.A § 1125(d) (1) (B) (i) (I).
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In applying the second factor of the bad faith test, concerning
"the extent to which the domain name consists of the legal name of
the person or a name that is otherwise commonly used to identify that
person,"138 the court announced flatly that "the domain name does
not consist of the legal name of the party that registered it,
Omega."139 This is a narrow application of the list's second factor,
since the domain name did indeed consist of the legal name of
Sporty's Farm, which was a wholly owned subsidiary of Omega.140
The court then proceeded to rule on the third factor of the list,
the "person's prior use, if any, of the domain name in connection with
the bona fide offering of any goods or services." 141 Although the do-
main name holder used the web-site in connection with its legitimate
Christmas tree business, the court held that a consideration of that
factor favored a finding of bad faith, since the domain name holder
only used the web-site for this purpose after litigation com-
menced 14 2-thus, he had no "prior use ... in connection with [his]
bona fide offering of... goods."'4 In ruling on these factors, the
court dosed loopholes by essentially holding that the domain name
holder must register the name in good faith and may not subse-
quently engage in activities such as establishing a business using the
disputed domain name as its legal name or offering legitimate goods
and services at the web site to shield itself from liability for an initial
bad faith registration.'4
The Sporty's Farm court also considered factors indicative of bad
faith that are not expressly listed by the Act 145 The court stated that
"[t]he most important grounds for our holding... are the unique
circumstances of this case, which do not fit neatly into the specific
factors enumerated by Congress,"146 including the fact that Omega's
138 Id. § 1125(d) (1) (B) (i) (H).
139 202 F.3d at 498-99.
140 See id. at 494.
141 See id. at 499 (applying 15 U.S.C.A § 1125(d) (1) (B) (i) (III)).
142 Seeid.
143 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d) (1) (B) (i) (II) (emphasis added).
144 A court has similarly found bad faith where the defendant formed a sham en-
tity bearing the name of the disputed domain name pnior to registration. SeeN. Light
Tech., Inc. v. N. Lights Club, 97 F. Supp. 2d 96, 119 (D. Mass. 2000) (finding bad faith
registration of "northemlights.com" upon finding that the defendant, who was the
president of an entity known as the Northern Lights Club, formed the Club as a fic-
tional entity to register the domain name).
145 See 202 F.3d at 499. The ACPA clearly states that "a court may consider factors
such as, but not /mited to," the enumerated factors of the bad faith checklist. 15
U.S.C.A. § 1125 (d) (1) (B) (i) (emphasis added).
146 202 F.3d at 499.
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owners subscribed to Sportsman's catalog and therefore had notice of
its "Sporty's" trademark. 147 The court also counted as indicative of
bad faith its inference that the domain name registrant Omega estab-
lished Sporty's Farm L.L.C. (which operated an unrelated business) in
order to "(1) use the sportys.com domain name in some commercial
fashion, (2) keep the name away from Sportsman's, and (3) protect
itself in the event that Sportsman's brought an infringement claim
alleging that 'a likelihood of confusion' had been created .... 148
The court finally noted that bad faith was evidenced by the domain
name holder's explanation of the subsidiary's name "Sporty's Farm"
as being indirectly named after a dog "Spotty," calling the explanation
"more amusing than credible." 149 By considering the intellectual
property rights of defendant domain name holders at the time of re-
gistration, rather than at the time of litigation, and by willingly exer-
cising its express power to consider unenumerated factors indicative
of bad faith,150 the court in Sporty's Farm set precedent for broad, but
not necessarily abusive or unintended, interpretation of the Act's bad
faith provisions.
Although the ACPA grants courts broad discretion to find bad
faith, as demonstrated by the Sporty's Farm court, the Act also
prescribes that courts shall not find bad faith whenever they "deter-
mine[] that the person believed and had reasonable grounds to be-
lieve that the use of the domain name was a fair use or otherwise
lawful." 151 Thus, if a defendant actually and reasonably believes that
his use of the domain name is lawful, the court will not grant relief to
the plaintiff under the ACPA, even if the domain name causes dilu-
tion.' 52 Courts, however, have so far rejected this subjective provision
defense in cases where bad faith was otherwise clearly established.
147 See id.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 500.
150 See also Morrison & Foerster LLP v. Wick, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1125 (D. Colo. 2000).
In Morrison & Foerster, the district court found that the "most persuasive reason" for
finding bad faith was the defendant's admission that he had registered the names of
Fortune 500 companies as well as variations of Morrison & Foerster and the names of
other law firms who represent these companies in an effort to "get even" with corpo-
rate America after having lost ajob. Id. at 1133. This obvious indication of bad faith
did not, as the court noted, "fit neatly into the specific factors enumerated in the
ACPA." Id.
151 15 U.S.G.A. § 1125(d) (1) (B) (ii) (West Supp. 2000).
152 Of course, such a defendant could possibly be enjoined under the Dilution
Act, which employs an objective standard for determining dilution. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(c) (1) (Supp. IV 1998). The plaintiff, however, would most likely not be enti.
tied to damages, since the Dilution Act only allows remedies other than injunctions,
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In Shields v. Zuccarin4'53 the defendant registered domain names
similar to the plaintiff's "joecartoon.com" trademark-domain name,
including "joescartoon.com, joecarton.com, joescartoons.com, and
cartoonjoe.com." 154 While originally using these domain names to
host web-sites displaying commercial advertisements, the defendant
posted web-sites protesting the plaintiff's web-site upon being sued. 155
The defendant claimed on his web-sites that he was protesting the
contents of the plaintiff's web-site, "joecartoon.com," which was di-
rected towards children and featured "the mutilation and killing of
[cartoon] animals."a56 After a fact-intensive inquiry, the district court
rejected the defendant's claim that he "reasonably believed that the
use of the domain name[s] was a fair use or otherwise lawful" 157 and
issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the defendant from using
the domain names.' 58 The court inferred that the defendant did not
reasonably believe his use was lawful from the facts that he originally
used the web-sites "for purely commercial purposes," that most of his
web-sites were commercial and/or sexually explicit and not political,
that he placed the political protest web-sites at the domain name only
hours after receiving notice of the plaintiff's lawsuit, and that he had
never in the past been an advocate for animal rights. 159 The court
concluded that the defendant's "claim of good faith and fair use [was]
a spurious explanation cooked up purely for this suit. . ."0 By
making a fact-intensive inquiry to determine the defendant's actual
intent in registering the domain names, the court in Shields demon-
strated the broad discretion that Congress granted to courts through
the subjective component of the Act.
161
when the defendant is found to have "willfully" diluted the plaintiffs famous mark.
See id. § 1125(c) (2).
153 89 F. Supp. 2d 634 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
154 Id. at 635.
155 See id
156 IM.
157 15 U.S.CA. § 1125 (d) (1) (B) (ii) (West Supp. 2000).
158 See 89 F. Supp. 2d at 641-42.
159 See id. at 640-41.
160 IM at 641.
161 The district court in Northern Light Tedozolog made a similar fact-intensive, sub-
jective inquiry to dismiss the defendants' ACPA "escape clause" defense, calling the
defendants' explanations for their web-sites "mere pretexts." &e N. light Tech., Inc.
v. N. Lights Club, 97 F. Supp. 2d 96, 118-19 (D. Mass. 2000). In Northern Ligl Tedeno!.
ogy, the court concluded that the defendants did not reasonably believe their use of
the domain name was lawful from the fact that they repeatediy changed their explana-
tions for the use of the domain name, which included explanations as varied as that
the web-site was "an experiment in a new business model" and that the web-site was
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3. Remedies Under the ACPA
The ACPA provides a variety of remedies to a plaintiff who suc-
cessfully proves the defendant's "bad faith intent to profit" from the
use, trafficking, or registration of a domain name that is "identical or
confusingly similar" or "dilutive" of the plaintiff's mark.16 2 First, the
court may order "forfeiture or cancellation of the domain name or
the transfer of the domain name to the owner of the mark."165 Sec-
ond, the Act also expressly permits injunctions'6 and damages as per-
mitted by the Lanham Act.' 65 These damages include lost profits
based on the defendant's sales, treble damages, and attorneys' fees in
"exceptional cases."166 Third, the ACPA allows plaintiffs to elect to
recover, "at any time before final judgment is recorded by the trial
court[,] ... instead of actual damages and profits, an award of statu-
tory damages in the amount of not less than $1000 and not more than
$100,000 per domain name, as the court considers just."167 A plaintiff
that endures no actual damages can now receive a monetary award.
This provides trademark owners with an obvious incentive to sue
rather than file a complaint with a UDRP dispute resolution service
provider. Plaintiffs will most likely also elect these statutory damages
in situations where actual damages cannot be easily proven 168 and in
created for persons "interested in the aurora borealis" (the natural phenomenon
commonly known as the Northern Lights). Id.
162 See generally Blasbalg, supra note 12, at 574-76 (discussing remedies available
under the AGPA).
163 15 U.S.C.A § 1125(d)(1)(C) (West Supp. 2000).
164 See 15 U.S.CA. § 1116(a) (West Supp. 2000) (as amended by ACPA, Pub. L.
No. 106-113, app. I, §3003(a)(1), 1999 U.S.C.CA.N. (113 Stat.) 1501A-545,
1501A-548).
165 See id. § 1117(a) (as amended by ACPA, § 3003(a) (2), 1999 U.S.C.C.A.N. (113
Stat.) at 1501A-549).
166 Id. These damages are always available in actions under § 1125(a) for trade-
mark infringement, see id., and in dilution actions when the defendant "willfully in-
tended to trade on the owner's reputation or to cause dilution of the famous mark,"
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2) (Supp. IV 1998).
167 15 U.S.CA § 1117(d) (West Supp. 2000) (emphasis added). Few decisions (as
of Sept. 23, 2000) offer insight into the amount of damages courts consider "just" to
award under the ACPA. See, e.g., Shields v. Zuccarini, No. CIVA.00-494, 2000 WL
1053884, at *1, *2 (E.D. Pa. July 18, 2000) (awarding total statutory damages of
$50,000, or $10,000 per domain name, plus attorneys' fees and costs where the court
had found the defendant's conduct "utterly parasitic and in complete bad faith");
United Greeks, Inc. v. Klein, No. 00-GV-0002, 2000 WL 554196, at *1, *2 (N.D.N.Y.
May 2, 2000) (awarding total statutory damages of $10,000, or $2000 per domain
name, plus attorneys' fees pursuant to a default judgment).
168 For example, where the primary actual damage is tarnishment of the plaintiff's
goodwill, the plaintiff may elect statutory damages rather than attempt to prove an
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situations where judges will likely grant statutory damages in an
amount greater than that permissible under § 1117(a) of the Lanham
Act.169
I. THE UDRP AND Tm ACPA. CAN THEY Co-LXsT?
With the implementation of the UDRP and the recent enactment
of the ACPA, trademark owners now have two new, formidable weap-
ons for use against cybersquatters. Trademark owners, who once had
to choose between NSI's dispute resolution policy--an incomplete
and inadequate solution17 0-and a lawsuit under the Dilution Act-a
statute that required liberal construction by courts to apply to cyber-
squatting17 1-now have at their disposal an alternative dispute resolu-
tion procedure and a federal statute that both address cybersquatting
directly. This Part discusses the likely relationship between the UDRP
and the ACPA and some of the potentially problematic issues raised
by both.
A. Trademark Owners' Choice Between the UDRP and Litigation
The UDRP is mandatory for respondents but not complain-
ants; 172 nothing in the language of the UDRP or its rules requires trade-
mark owners to utilize the available administrative proceedings to
reclaim a trademark-domain name from a cybersquatter. Where juris-
diction permits,173 trademark owners are therefore always free to
bring suit under the ACPA, the Dilution Act, or other applicable law.
Trademark owners interested in rapid retrieval or cancellation of
a domain name from a cybersquatter should choose the UDRP to seek
actual dollar amount of damages suffered. See Neil L. Martin, supra note 12, at 607
(stating that plaintiffs doubtful of their ability to prove actual damages may elect statu-
tory damages).
169 For example, if actual damages are relatively minor, but the defendant exhibits
an egregious "bad faith intent," the court may find itjust to amard statutory damages
of up to $100,000 per domain name, even if this amount far exceeds the sum of the
defendant's profits, treble actual damages, and attorneys fees permissible under 15
U.S.C. § 1117(a)-(b) (1994).
170 See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text; see also Eng, supra note 12, 1
44-51 (discussing the problems of NSI's old policy and the improvements made by
ICANN in the UDRP); Walker, supra note 12, at 294-96 (discussing the inadequacies
of NSI's old procedure that have been resolved by the UDRP).
171 See supra Part H.A.
172 See UDRP, supra note 2, 1 4a.
173 The ACPA minimizes the problem of lack ofjurisdicion by allo ing plaintiffs
unable to obtain personal jurisdiction over a defendant or unable to locate a defen-
dant to bring in rem actions against the domain name. See 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 1125(d) (2) (A) (West Supp. 2000); infra note 201.
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redress.' 74 Unlike federal litigation, the UDRP offers guaranteed ex-
peditious resolution. Administrative panels applying the UDRP must
generally resolve a domain name dispute and submit the results to the
dispute resolution provider within forty-five days after commence-
ment of the proceeding by the complainant. 175 The dispute resolu-
tion provider must then notify the parties and ICANN of the panel's
decision within three days of its submission. 176 Unless the respondent
appeals the panel's decision in a court of competent jurisdiction,
ICANN will implement the decision as final and binding ten days after
it receives notice of the decision from the dispute resolution pro-
vider.177 Thus, ICANN can implement a decision to transfer or cancel
a domain name in less than fifty-seven days, or two months following
commencement of the proceeding.
The first dispute resolved under the UDRP, World Wrestling Federa-
tion Entertainment, Inc. v. Bosman,178 was decided only thirty-sLx days
following the commencement of the proceeding, 79 giving the UDRP
early credibility with the national press.'80 Federal litigation offers no
time guarantees, with some district courts taking as few as forty-nine
174 See Walker, supra note 12, at 306-08 (lauding the UDRP for its "time-and-cost
efficien [cy]").
175 See ICANN FAQ, supra note 6. Specifically, the UDRP provides for resolution
within thirty-nine days of commencement of a proceeding when both parties agree to
resolution by a one person panel or when the complainant elects a three person
panel. See UDRP RuLEs, supra note 3, 5(a), 6(b), (e), 15(b) (allowing the respon-
dent twenty days to submit a response upon commencement of the proceeding, re-
quiring the dispute resolution provider to appoint a panel to decide the dispute
within five days of receipt of the response, and requiring the panel "in the absence of
exceptional circumstances" to forward its decision to the dispute resolution provider
for communication to the parties within fourteen days). When a three person panel
is elected by the respondent to decide a dispute, the UDRP generally requires resolu-
tion within forty-four days. See UDRP RULES, supra note 3, 6(d), (e) (allowing the
complainant an additional five days after receiving the response to submit the names
of its choices for one panelist before the dispute resolution provider appoints the
panel).
176 See UDRP RuLEs, supra note 3, 16.
177 See UDRP, supra note 2, 4k.
178 World Wrestling Fed'n Entr't, Inc. v. Bosman, WIPO, No. D99-0001, at http:/
/arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/d99-0001.html (Jan. 14, 2000) (Donahcy,
Arb.), cited in Walker, supra note 12, at 308. See generally, Donahey & Hilbert, supra
note 12 (discussing the World Wrestling Federation Entertainment case).
179 The respondent received notification of the complaint on December 9, 1999,
and the panelist reached a decision on January 14, 2000. See World Wrestling Fed'n
Entm't, Inc. v. Bosman, WIPO, No. D99-0001, 3, 7, at http://arbiter.wipo.int/do-
mains/decisions/html/d99-0001.html (Jan. 14, 2000) (Donahey, Arb.).
180 See Jeri Clausing, Wrestling Group Wins Back Use of Its Name on Internet, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 17, 2000, at C4.
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days and as many as 202 days181 upon commencement of an ACPA
action to render a decision granting or denying a preliminary injunc-
tion.182 When time is of the essence, the UDRP offers the most effec-
tive means for a trademark owner to retrieve a domain name from a
cybersquatter.
The UDRP's second major advantage over litigation is its lower
costs' 8 3 -ICANN hailed the UDRP for its ability to permit a trade-
mark owner to retrieve a single domain name through an administra-
tive proceeding for approximately $1000 in fees.184 Currently, four
competing ICANN-approved dispute resolution providers conduct
proceedings under the UDRP,185 with fees ranging between $750 to
$2000 for resolution of a single domain name dispute before a single
panelist, and between $2200 and $4500 for resolution by a three per-
son panel.'8 6 Due to its low cost, the UDRP is especially useful, as one
This case shows that the policy works as it was intended. Victims of clear
cases of cybersquatting should have a quick and cheap way of protecting
themselves from continued abuses. Traditional court remedies are usually
much more expensive and lengthy, and remedies like this are needed to
keep global electronic commerce running on Internet time.
Id. (quoting Louis Touton, vice president and general counsel of ICANN).
181 This statistic accounts for only those few decisions mentioning the date on
which the complaint or motion for preliminary injunction was originally filed. &e
Bihari v. Gross, No. O0CV.1664(SAS), 2000 WL 1409757, at *3, *17 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25,
2000) (denying preliminary injunction 202 days following service of the complaint
and motion for injunctive relief); N. Light Tech., Inc. v. N. Lights Club, 97 F. Supp.
2d 96, 98 n.1, 122 (D. Mass. 2000) (granting preliminary injunction 108 da)s after the
plaintiff filed its amended complaint); Morrison & Foerster LLP v. Wick, 94 F. Supp.
2d 1125, 1128, 1136 (D. Colo. 2000) (deciding consolidated preliminary injunction
hearing and trial on the merits forty-nine days after commencement of the action);
Broadbridge Media, L.L.C. v. HyperCD.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 505, 508, 512 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (granting preliminary injunction seventy-five da)s after plaintiff moved for a
preliminary injunction); Big Star Entm't, Inc. v. Next Big Star, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d
185, 191, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (denying preliminary injunction seventy days after mo-
tion for preliminary injunction).
182 See FED. R. Crv. P. 65(a). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b) for the procedures
governing the issuance of temporary restraining orders (TROs). Although TROs can
grant faster relief than a preliminary injunction, see, e.g., Morrison & Foerste, 94 F.
Supp. 2d at 1128 (mentioning grant of TRO eight da)s after commencement of ac-
tion), TROs provide an inadequate solution to trademark owners since the order nor-
mally expires ten days after issuance, see Fn. R. Crv. P. 65(b).
183 See Walker, supra note 12, at 306-08 (lauding the UDRP for its "time-and-cost
efficien[cy]").
184 See ICANN FAQ, supra note 6.
185 See ICANN Approved Providers, supra note 41.
186 See CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution, CPR's Supplemental Rules and Fee Sched-
ule 12, at http://wv.cpradr.org/ICANN_RulesAndFees.htm (last visited Sept. 23,
2000) (offering resolution of a dispute involving one to two domain names for $2000
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author noted, for reclaiming domain names offered for sale by cyber-
squatters at a "nuisance value"187 less expensive than litigation but
much more expensive than the out-of-pocket costs of registering the
domain name.188 In addition, as one commentator noted, the cost-
efficiency of the UDRP can benefit "small-business defendants who do
not have the financial resources to battle major corporations in
court."
1 89
Given the UDRP's inherent cost and time advantages, why liti-
gate? First, the UDRP was intentionally drafted to have a narrower
scope than the ACPA due to the inherent limitations of the simple
online dispute resolution procedure.190 A cybersquatter who uses a
domain name prior to notice of the dispute "in connection with a
bona fide offering of goods or services"' 91 or is "commonly known by
the domain name"192 has an absolute defense under the UDRP 93 but
may be found in violation of the ACPA.194 The second major reason
for a trademark owner to litigate rather than seek administrative reso-
lution of a cybersquatting dispute under the UDRP is to seek damages
and remedies other than cancellation and transfer of the disputed
name.195
A trademark owner, however, can also have the best of both
worlds: rapid retrieval of an infringing or dilutive domain name
before a single panelist or $4500 before three panelists); eResolution: Integrity On-
line, Schedule of Fees, at http://www.eresolution.ca/services/dnd/schedule.htm (last
modified Aug. 19, 2000) (offering resolution of a dispute concerning one to two do-
main names for $750 before a single panelist or $2200 before a three person panel);
National Arbitration Forum, Dispute Resolution for Domain Names Schedule of Fees, at
http://vww.arbforum.com/domains/domain-fees.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2000)
(offering resolution of a single domain name dispute for $750 by a single arbitrator or
$2250 before a three arbitrator panel); World Intellectual Property Organization Ar-
bitration and Mediation Center, Schedule of Fees under the ICANN Policy, at http://arbi-
ter.wipo.int/domains/fees/index.html (valid as of Aug. 15, 2000) (offering
resolution of a dispute concerning one to five domain names for $1500 before a sin-
gle panelist or $3000 before three panelists).
187 Walker, supra note 12, at 307.
188 See id.
189 Evan Hansen, House, Courts Make Decisions on Cybersquatting, at http://
news.cnet. com/category/0-1005-200-1402912.html (Oct. 26, 1999), quoted in Melville,
supra note 12, 3.
190 See infra Part III.C.
191 UDRP, supra note 2, 1 4c(i).
192 Id. I1 4c(ii).
193 See id. 4c.
194 See infra Part III.C.
195 See supra Part II.B.3 for a complete discussion of remedies available under the
ACPA.
[VOL- 76a1
NOTE: DOMAIN NAME DISPUTES
through the UDRP and a subsequent award of damages under the
AGPA.196 The district court's recent decision in Broadbridge Media,
L.L.C. v. HypercD.com'97 confirms that a trademark owner may file suit
in federal court to resolve a domain name dispute while concurrently
seeking resolution through an ICANN administrative proceeding.193
Evoking the UDRP to rapidly retrieve a domain name prior to or con-
current with filing suit is economically prudent, since trademark own-
ers lose potential customers every day that a domain name
corresponding to the trademark is unavailable. 19 Thus, even trade-
mark owners seeking damages will find the UDRP useful for recover-
ing a domain name as quickly as possible to minimize lost profits.
Trademark owners may have, in certain limited circumstances,
reasons other than the availability of remedies, to litigate rather than
seek administrative resolution of a dispute falling within the substan-
tive scope of the UDRP. For example, a trademark owner believing
that the domain name holder will probably appeal an administrative
panel's decision may find litigation from the onset of the dispute to be
more efficient than obtaining a favorable administrative panel deci-
sion and later rearguing the same claim in court.200 Also, the Anti-
cyberquatting Act, unlike the UDRP, allows in ren actions over domain
names should the trademark owner be unable to locate a defen-
dant 2 0 The UDRP, however, may be the best option for disputes in-
196 See UDRP, supra note 2, 4k ("The mandatory administrative proceeding re-
quirements ... shall not prevent either you or the complainant from submitting the
dispute to a court of competent jurisdiction for independent resolution before such
mandatory administrative proceeding is commenced or after such proceeding is con-
cluded."(emphasis added)).
197 106 F. Supp. 2d 505 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
198 See iUL at 509 (finding that paragraph 4k of the UDRP, which expressly permits
trademark owners to seekjudicial resolution of domain name disputes before or after
an administrative proceeding, does not implicitly forbid a trademark owner from fil-
ing suit while the administrative proceeding is pending).
199 See Walker, supra note 12, at 307.
200 See UDRP, supra note 2, 4k (allowing the respondent to appeal a panel's
decision to a "court of competent jurisdiction" within ten da)s following notice of the
decision and stating that ICANN will take no further action until the court case is
resolved, dismissed, or withdrawn).
201 See 15 U.S.CA. § 1125 (d) (2) (A) (West Supp. 2000). Specifically, the Act per-
mits an in rem action where:
the court finds that the owner-
(I) is not able to obtain in personam jurisdiction over a person who would
have been a defendant in a civil action under paragraph (1) [in per-
sonam action under the ACPA]; or
(II) through due diligence was not able to find a person who would have
been a defendant in a civil action under paragraph (1) by-
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volving foreign parties, since it avoids issues of national jurisdiction 202
and allows panels to consider applicable principles of foreign law.20 3
In general, however, for clear cybersquatting cases falling under the
scope of both the UDRP and the ACPA,204 the UDRP should serve as a
complement to litigation when damages are sought and a litigation
replacement for trademark owners seeking mere recovery of a domain
name from a cybersquatter.
B. "Reverse Domain Name Hijacking"
The range of remedies available under the ACPA and the Lan-
ham Act is an obvious reason to litigate instead of or in addition to
resolving a domain name dispute through a UDRP administrative
panel.20 5 These remedies, particularly the ACPA's provision for statu-
tory damages of up to $100,000 per domain name, will not only en-
courage litigation but could also, according to University of Miami law
professor A. Michael Froomkin, coerce settlement between large cor-
porate trademark owners and small business and individual domain
name registrants regardless of the merits of the claims.
206
One of the major things it's going to achieve is that now you can
write these scary demand letters to mom and pop domain regis-
trants, and say, "Do what we say, or you risk being liable for up to
$100,000." Unless they go to a lawyer and find out where they
(aa) sending a notice of the alleged violation and intent to proceed
under this paragraph to the registrant of the domain name at the
postal and e-mail address provided by the registrant to the regis-
trar, and
(bb) publishing notice of the action as the court may direct promptly
after filing the action.
Id. § 1125(d) (2) (A) (ii).
202 See UDRP, supra note 2, at n.2 (applying to all domain name registrations in
the ".com," ".org," and ".net" gTLDs (irrespective of the location of the registrants)
and certain country-code TLDs including ".nu," ".tv," and ".ws").
203 See UDRP RuLES, supra note 3, 15(a) (allowing a panel to consider "any rules
and principles of law that it deems applicable").
204 See infra Part III.C.
205 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1116(a) (West Supp. 2000) (preserving the availability of in-
junctions under the Lanham Act to ACPA plaintiffs); id. § 1117(a) (preserving the
availability of treble damages, defendant's profits, and attorneys fees under the Lan-
ham Act); id. § 1117(d) (permitting election of statutory damages of up to $100,000
per domain name); id. § 1125(d) (1) (C) (providing for forfeiture and transfer of do-
main name).
206 See Carolyn Lochhead, Web-Address Legislation Called Flawed; Corporations Could
Dominate Small-Firm Sites, Experts Say, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 18, 1999, at Al, A19 (citing A.
Michael Froomkin).
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stand, they'rejust going to cave, because that's a scary, big number
for your average small-business person.
2 07
Nevertheless, while Professor Froomkin reasonably fears that the
ACPA's damages provision could encourage "reverse domain name
hijacking"208 through coerced settlement, the Act is unlikely to con-
done seriously abusive lawsuits by trademark owners against legitimate
domain name holders, since plaintiffs have the statutory burden of
showing bad faith.
20 9
207 Id. at A19 (quoting A. Michael Froomkin); see also id. (Reverse domain name
hijacking occurs "when you as an individual user have a perfectly legitimate registered
domain name, and somebody with a trademark sends you a mean note from a lawyer
threatening you with a lawsuit and all kinds of expenses and tries to take the name
away from you." (quoting Milton Mueller)).
208 See id. The term "reverse domain name hijacking' originally referred to abu-
sive use of NSI's dispute resolution policy by registered trademark holders to strip
legitimate, non-infringing users of a corresponding domain name. See Oppedahl,
supra note 33. When litigated, courts often order the "reverse domain name hijacker"
to return the domain name to the original registrant. See id. at 538-41 (discussing
Interstellar Starship Sers., Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 1331 (D. Or. 1997), reuld,
184 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1161 (2000) (returning domain
name "epixcom" to Interstellar for its non-infringing use); CD Solutions, Inc. v.
Tooker, 15 F. Supp. 2d 986 (D. Or. 1998) (finding that CD (compact discs) Solutions'
use of "cds.com" did not infringe or dilute Commercial Documentation Service's reg-
istered trademark "CDS"); Data Concepts, Inc. v. Digital Consulting, Inc., 150 F.3d
620 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding that Data Concepts' use of "dci.com" did not infringe
Digital Consulting's corresponding trademark; noting that there are many concurrent
non-infringing users of the "DCI" mark)). NSI's dispute resolution policy permitted
"reverse domain name hijacking" by granting federally registered trademark holders
the power to suspend any domain name "identical" to their marks, see NSI Poucv;
supra note 29, § 8, even if the domain name is a legitimate, non-infringing, and non-
dilutive use of the mark, see Oppedahl, supra note 33, at 536-37. Commentators have
not predicted that the ACPA will allow "reverse domain name hijackers" to succeed
on the merits, but rather that a threat of $100,000 in damages in a cease and desist
letter will coerce legitimate users to surrender a sought-after domain name. See
Lochhead, supra note 206, at A19 (quoting A. Michael Froomkin & Milton Mueller).
209 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d) (1) (A) (i) (West Supp. 2000); supra Part II.B.2.
Courts may consider (among other factors) when determining bad faith "the trade-
mark or other intellectual property rights of the person, if any, in the domain name,"
"the extent to which the domain name consists of the legal name of the person or a
name that is othenvise commonly used to identify that person," or "prior use... in
connection with the bona fide offering of any goods or services." 15 U.S.CA
§ 1125 (d) (1) (B) (i)(I)-(llI). As a further safeguard to legitimate domain name users,
the ACPA provides that "[b]ad faith intent... shall not be found in any case in uhich
the court determines that the person believed and had reasonable grounds to believe
that the use of the domain name was a fair use or othemise lmful." Id.
§ 1125(d) (1) (B) (ii).
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In addition to pointing out the potential of the ACPA to allow
"reverse domain name hijacking" through cease and desist letters,
Professor Froomkin has criticized the UDRP for inadequately address-
ing the same problem.2 1 0 The UDRP fails to impose sanctions, be-
sides a simple reprimand, against those attempting to use the
administrative proceedings to commit "reverse domain name hi-
jacking."2 1 1 Commentators also feared that the UDRP's three enu-
merated defenses would be the three exclusive defenses available to
respondents.2 1 2 While these three defenses do not exhaust the possi-
ble legitimate ways to use a domain name that is also another person's
trademark,2 13 this provision does not encourage "reverse domain
name hijacking" since the UDRP specifically authorizes panelists to
consider other factors evidencing legitimate rights.2 14 The UDRP
210 See Froomkin, supra note 69.
The current UD[R]P contains no meaningful punishment for reverse do-
main name hijacking (RDNH) other than the potential slap on the wrist of
being chastised in an [sic] decision. Nor, other than the aspects of the policy
that might make it hard for RDNH to succeed (primarily the defenses listed
in Policy 4c), does it contain provisions calculated to deter RDNH.
Id.
211 See UDRP RULES, supra note 3, 15(e). The UDRP's rules direct a panel find-
ing "reverse domain name hijacking" to merely "declare in its decision that the corn-
plaint as brought in bad faith and constitutes an abuse of the administrative
proceeding." Id.
212 See Kathryn A. Kleiman & David A. Maher, Non-Commercial Domain Name
Holders Constituency of the Domain Name Support Organization ("NCDNHC"),
Comments of Noncommercial Constituency, at http://www.icann.org/comments-mail/
comment-udrp/current/msgOO104.html (Oct. 13, 1999) (supporting expansion of
the UDRP to apply to "reverse domain name hijacking"; arguing that UDRP 4c
should be change4 to a list of "[sJome [e]xamples of [w]ays to [dJemonstrate" legiti-
mate rights since the current list of three defenses is "far from a fully inclusive list of
defenses and both domain name holders and arbitrators should be alerted to this
fact").
213 See id.
214 See UDRP, supra note 2, 4c. For example, panels have ruled that respondents
can have legitimate interests in a domain name on grounds that the complainant's
corresponding trademark is "generic or descriptive"-a factor not expressly enumer-
ated by UDRP 4c. See, e.g., CRS Tech. Corp. v. Condenet, Inc., NAF, FA0093547, at
http://v.arbforum.com/domains/decisions/93547.html (Mar. 28, 2000) (Bern-
stein & Ayers, Arbs.) (finding respondent to have possible legitimate interests in the
"generic [and] descriptive" domain name "concierge.com"-a domain name identi-
cal to the complainant's registered "Concierge" trademark); General Mach. Prods.
Co. v. Prime Domains, NAF, FA0092531, at http://wv.arbforum.com/domains/de.
cisions/92531.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2000) (Carney, Arb.) (finding respondent to
have legitimate interests in the generic and descriptive domain name "craftwork.com"
even though it had offered to sell the domain name to the complainant for as much
as $30,000).
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merely states that the enumerated defenses "in particular but without
limitation" may be used to demonstrate legitimate rights in the domain
name.
2 15
Furthermore, since the UDRP does not provide for damages or
fines216 and allows appeals in court of administrative decisions,217 the
UDRP does not, in my estimation, promote or provide a sympathetic
forum for "reverse domain name hjackers." By preempting NSI's dis-
pute resolution policy, which permitted several documented cases of
"reverse domain name hljacking,"218 the UDRP can be viewed as an
expansion of the rights of legitimate users of domain names against
trademark owners. Nevertheless, "reverse domain name hijacking,"
whether encouraged by the damages provision of the ACPA or, less
likely,219 by loopholes in the UDRP, must be addressed in the future
by Congress22 0-and/or ICANN 221 -should it ever become prevalent
and problematic.
215 UDRP, supra note 2, 4c. This language was also included in the original draft
version of the UDRP. See INTERNET CORPORATION FOR AssIGED NxIEs AND NtMB ERs,
DRAFT UNIFORM DOimxN NAME DISrfUTE REsotUt~ON Poucy % 4c, at http://
w.icann.org/udrp/udrp-polic-29sept99.htm (Sept. 29, 1999).
216 See UDRP, supra note 2, 4i (limiting remedies to the cancellation or transfer
of the challenged domain name).
217 See UDRP, supra note 2, 4k.
218 See generally Oppedahl, supra note 33 (discussing cases involving "reverse do-
main name hijacking" under the NSI policy).
219 But see Blasbalg, supra note 12, at 594-98. Blasbalg argues that the ACPA's "fair
use" defense, combined with the "fair use" defense of the Lanham Act and the subjec-
tive provision of the ACPA, directing findings for defendants reasonably believing
that their use of a domain name is fair or lawfIul, provide adequate safeguards against
"reverse domain name hijacking." See iL at 594-95. Blasbalg, however, fears that the
UDRP will allow "reverse domain name hjacking," since the defenses available under
the ACPA are unavailable under the UDRP, because the ten day period to appeal a
UDRP opinion is too short, and because the domain name holder has the burden of
proof in ajudicial appeal of a UDRP decision. See id. at 595, 597. Blasbalg, however,
overlooks the fact that UDRP I 4c provides even broader defenses than the ACPA and
the fact that these defenses, if proven, are absolute. See UDRP, supra note 2, J[ 4c;
supra Part I.B; infra Part lI.C.
220 Should the need arise, Congress could amend the ACPA to provide a federal
cause of action for "reverse domain name hijacking." This cause of action could be
brought as a counterclaim under Rule 13 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
cases where the trademark owner commences litigation against the domain name
holder or an independent cause of action where the trademark owner merely seeks to
coerce settlement. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13.
221 Empowering UDRP administrative panels to impose fines would serve as an
obvious deterrent to "reverse domain name hijacking." SeeWalker, supra note 12, at
311 (arguing in favor of including in the UDRP "a measure that will combat reverse
hijacking just as forcefully as it attempts to combat cybersquatting").
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C. Lack of Harmonization Between the UDRP and Federal
Trademark Law
While trademark owners will probably use the UDRP to reclaim a
domain name quickly and inexpensively and alternatively sue the do-
main name holder when damages are sought, differences in substan-
tive rights provided by the UDRP and the ACPA also influence the
decision whether to litigate or seek administrative resolution. '22 In
general, the UDRP provides narrower protection to trademarks than
does federal law so as to avoid entangling administrative panels in dis-
putes involving "competing legitimate rights" as opposed to instances
of cybersquatting.223 The UDRP would not have, for instance, been
available to the parties in Juno Online Services, L.P. v. Juno Lighting,
Inc.,224 in which the court dismissed a Lanham Act action by Juno
Online, an Internet services provider, against Juno Lighting, a manu-
facturer and retailer of lighting who had registered the domain name
'Juno-online.com." 225 Highlighting the substantive limitations of the
UDRP, one corporate intellectual property counsel pointed out:
[I]f a competitor misappropriated the domain name dis-
neycds.com, they might not be cybersquatting, but this does not
necessarily imply that they have proof of legitimate rights. A court
may find that the owner of disneycds.com is infringing or diluting a
trademark-a process that is not covered by the UDRP process.2
26
For this reason, several commercial constituencies insisted (unsuccess-
fully) that ICANN change the defenses of paragraph 4c to be "[rele-
222 See supra Part IIIA.
223 See Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741, 37,147
(Dep't of Commerce June 4, 1998); ICANN FAQ supra note 6.
224 979 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
225 1It at 693. For other examples of domain name disputes involving "competing
legitimate rights" beyond the scope of the UDRP, see, for example, Data Concepts, Inc.
v. Digital Consulting, Inc., 150 F.3d 620 (6th Cir. 1998) (reversing summary judgment
enjoining Data Concepts' use of "dci.com"; finding concurrent rights between both
parties in the mark); Teletech Customer Care Management, Inc. v. Tele-Tech Co., 977 F.
Supp. 1407 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (granting an injunction against Tele-Tech's use of do-
main name "teletech.com" (no hyphen)).
226 Sarah B. Deutsch, Senior Intellectual Property Counsel, Bell Atlantic Network
Services, Inc., Comments on the UDRP, at http://www.icann.org/comments-mail/com-
ment-udrp/current/msg00090.html (Oct. 13, 1999); see also International Trademark
Association (INTA), supra note 70 (criticizing (among other provisions) the "demon-
strable preparations to use ... in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or
services" defense of the UDRP); Philip M. Davidson, Staff Counsel-Trademarks, Gate-
way, Inc., Comments on ICANN's Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, at http:/
/xvv.icann.org/comments-mail/comment-udrp/current/msg00085.html (Oct. 13,
1999).
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vant] 'factors' [rather than] conclusive proof of 'legitimate rights.'"22
By downgrading the paragraph 4c defenses of use "in connection ith
a bona fide offering of goods or services,"22 8 being "commonly known
by the domain name,"229 and "legitimate noncommercial or fair
use"230 to inconclusive evidence of legitimate rights, these commenta-
tors hoped to expand the UDRP to allow administrative panels to give
greater consideration to the presence or absence of trademark in-
fringement or dilution.231 These changes would have helped, at least
in some circumstances, to harmonize the UDRP with federal trade-
mark law while expanding the rights of trademark owners seeking re-
lief through the UDRP.
Nevertheless, the Commerce Department insisted in its 117die Pa-
per that any administrative dispute resolution policy of the to-be-
formed non-profit corporation, which became ICANN, limit its scope
to cybersquatting.232 The reason for this limitation seems clear. As
Professor Froomkin mentioned, "complex fact-intensive cases," such
as those involving disputes between competing legitimate trademark
rights, are inappropriate for the "extremely lightweight procedure" of
the UDRP.233 Fact-intensive disputes or those involving issues of cred-
ibility belong, according to Froomkin, "in court or in a more tradi-
tional arbitration where parties can be heard directly."23 4 Indeed, it is
doubtful whether a three arbitrator panel could decide through
pleadings submitted online whether there is underlying infringement
or dilution after the domain name holder proves a UDRP paragraph
4c defense.
227 International Trademark Association (INTA), supra note 70; accord Davidson,
supra note 226; Deutsch, supra note 226.
228 UDRP, supra note 2, 4c(i).
229 Id. 4c(ii). Incidentally, INTA suggested that this defense be struck. S&eInter-
national Trademark Association (INTA), supra note 70.
230 UDRP, supra note 2, 4c(iii).
231 See International Trademark Association (INTA), supra note 70; accord David-
son, supra note 226; Deutsch, supra note 226.
232 See Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741, 31,747
(Dep't of CommerceJune 4,1998) (calling on the World Intellectual Property Organ-
ization to "develop recommendations for a uniform approach to resolving trade-
mark/domain name disputes involving cyberpiracy [cybersquatting] (,as opposed to
conflicts between trademark holders with legitimate competing rights)").
233 Froomkin, supra note 69 (criticizing INTA's comments to the UDRP).
234 1&
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For example, in the recent Sporty's Farm case,235 the Second Cir-
cuit found that the domain name holder who had formed a company
selling Christmas trees legally named and doing business (and thus
probably commonly known) as Sporty's Farm had registered the
"sportys.com" domain name in bad faith 23 6 despite the fact that it may
have had a UDRP paragraph 4c(ii) defense of being "commonly
known" by the domain name. The domain name holder might have
benefited from this defense in an administrative proceeding simply by
demonstrating in its response that it conducted business as "Sporty's
Farm L.L.C."23 7 In Sporty's Farm, the court made a fact-intensive deter-
mination to find bad faith on grounds that the domain name holder
planned to enter the aviation catalog business in competition with the
trademark owner, that its CEO subscribed to Sportsman's Market's
catalog and knew of its "Sporty's" trademark, and that the CEO's ex-
planation for naming his Christmas tree business indirectly after his
childhood dog "Spotty" lacked credibility.23 8 This complex finding re-
lied on facts not easily accessible to the trademark owner without dis-
covery and on a rejection of the credibility of the domain name
holder's testimony. As Professor Froomkin might agree,23 9 the dis-
pute over "sportys.com" most likely could not have been resolved on-
line by a UDRP administrative panel without the benefits of formal
discovery and face-to-face examination of witnesses.
In fact, the UDRP is so limited to straight forward instances of
cybersquatting that the UDRP paragraph 4c(ii) defense of being
"commonly known by the domain name" could theoretically apply to
counterfeiters who become "commonly known" as a domain name by
intentionally causing confusion in- the minds of consumers. This re-
235 Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489 (2d Cir. 2000),
cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 2719 (2000). See supra Part II.B.2 for a discussion of the Sporly's
Farm case.
236 See 202 F.3d at 498-99.
237 See UDRP, supra note 2, at 4c (stating that the enumerated defenses of 4c,
including the 4c(ii) defense of being "commonly known by the domain name" If
"proved based on [an] evaluation of all evidence presented, shall demonstrate...
rights or legitimate interests to the domain name"). This defense applies irrespective
of trademark rights. See id.; see also id. 4a (placing burden of proof on the complain-
ant to show lack of "rights or legitimate interests in respect of domain name").
238 See 202 F.3d. at 498-99. Since the UDRP's defenses conclusively establish legit-
imate rights, see UDRP, supra note 2, 4c, an administrative panel would not be per-
mitted to weigh the respondent's defense against bad faith factors proven by the
complainant. See UDRP, supra note 2, 4a(ii)-(iii) (stating that the complainant
must prove lack of rights or legitimate interests and bad faith); UDRP RuOs, supra
note 3, 3(b) (ix) (2)-(3).
239 See Froomkin, supra note 69.
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suit is tolerable, since the alternative solution would be to allow a one
or three person administrative panel to decide complex substantive
issues of infringement or dilution and to pass judgment on the credi-
bility of the parties' written assertions without discovery2 40 and with-
out an opportunity to question the parties directly.2 41 The failure of
the UDRP to cover a full range of trademark/domain name disputes
should not, therefore, be deemed an inconsistency with federal trade-
mark law, but rather an intentional and well-reasoned limitation of
scope.
D. Freedom of Speech Concerns
Commentators have criticized the UDRP for expanding the rights
of trademark owners at the expense of domain name holders' free-
dom of speech. This criticism of the UDRP stems from the paragraph
4c(iii) defense of "legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the do-
main name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert
consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue"2 42 As
Kathryn Kleiman & David Maher noted on behalf of the Non-Com-
mercial Domain Name Holders Constituency (NCDNHC), "[i]mplicit
in this expression of the defense is the principle that even a legitimate
noncommercial use, WITH INTENT to tarnish, is tantamount to
cybersquatting."243 The tarnishment clause could, in the views of
some experts, threaten freedom of speech by stifling both "legitimate
criticism" of corporations 244 and complaint or "gripe" sites such as
"microsoft-sucks.com." 245 Contrary to these commentators' fears, the
UDRP will not apply to a "gripe" web-site at a domain name such as
240 While UDRP rules do not permit interrogatories, depositions, or other discov-
ery between parties, administrative panels "may request, ['in addition to the com-
plaint and the response'] further statements or documents from either of the
Parties." UDRP RULES, supra note 3, 12.
241 See i. 13 (stating that panels shall hold in-person hearings (including tele-
phonic, video, and Internet conferences) only as "an exceptional matter, that such a
hearing is necessary for deciding the complaint" (emphasis added)).
242 UDRP, supra note 2, 4c(iii) (emphasis added).
243 Kleiman & Maher, supra note 212; see also Froomkin, supra note 69 (criticizing
the tarnishment provision); Jonathan Weinberg, Coynments on UDRP--Crrmetd Cap),
at http://www.icann.org/comments-mail/comment-udrp/current/msgOOlO3.htrnl
(Oct. 14, 1999) (condemning the tarnishment provision; agreeing isith Froomkin).
244 Froomkin, supra note 69 ("A cite [sic] designed to attack a company's labor
practices (or] its environmental record ('MegaCo kills the earth') might be consid-
ered to show an intent (recall-it's mere intent, not even actual tarnishment) to tar-
nish a mark.").
245 Weinberg, supra note 243 (stating that the owner of "microsoft-sucks.com"
could lose the domain name in an administrative hearing).
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"microsoft-sucks.com," even if the respondent is unable to demon-
strate legitimate rights in the domain name,246 since the complainant
would be unable to demonstrate that the domain name is "identical or
confusingly similar" to the complainant's trademark.2 47 Since "con-
fusingly similar" has been defined by an administrative panel and a
district court in Northern Light Technology, Inc. v. Northern Lights Club" 8
as essentially alphanumeric or facial similarity, 249 protest pages should
be permissible at domain names incorporating, but facially dissimilar
to, a trademark such as "microsoft-sucks.com." Furthermore, even ad-
ministrative panels rejecting the Northern Light Technology court's ob-
jective definition of "confusingly similar" and applying a contextual
approach focusing on "likelihood of confusion"250 will not find a do-
main name such as "microsoft-sucks.com" to be confusingly similar to
"Microsoft" since few rational consumers would believe that such a site
is actually hosted by Microsoft.251
In addition to criticizing the tamishment clause for threatening
free speech, these commentators pointed out that the tarnishment
246 See UDRP, supra note 2, 1 4c.
247 UDRP RuL.s, supra note 3, 3(b) (ix) (1); see also UDRP, supra note 2, 1 4a(i).
248 97 F. Supp. 2d 96, 117 (D. Mass. 2000) (interpreting "confusingly similar" in
the context of the ACPA).
249 See InfoSpace.com, Inc. v. Delighters, Inc., WIPO, No. D2000-0068, 6A, at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/d2000-OO68.html (May 1, 2000)
(Partridge, Arb.) (citing N. Light Tech., Inc. v. N. Lights Club, 97 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D.
Mass. 2000)); see also Europay Int'l SA. v. Eurocard.com, Inc., WIPO, No. D2000-0173,
7.6, at http://arbiter.vipo.int/domains/decisions/htm/d2000-O173.html (May 22,
2000) (Fashler, Arb,) (comparing the disputed domain name directly, rather than
contextually, with the complainant's trademark); A.P. Moller v. Web Soc., WIPO, No.
D2000-0135, 1 6, at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/d2000-
0135.htnl (Apr. 15, 2000) (Limbury, Arb.) (same).
250 97 F. Supp. 2d at 117 (citing 3 McCTmy, supra note 1, § 23:4) (comparing the
contextual test of "likelihood of confusion" with the objective, facial test for "confus-
ingly similar" intended by Congress under the ACPA).
251 Cf AT&T Corp. v. Alamuddin, WIPO, No. D2000-0249, 6-7, at http://arbi-
ter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/d2000-O249.html (May 18, 2000) (Barker,
Arb.) (applying the trademark law of Australia, England, and New Zealand to find
that the domain name "ATT2000.com" was confusingly similar to the trademark
AT&T since "most persons in the United States and most visitors to that country-
could be confused into thinking that <ATr2000.COM> was some millennium promo-
tion by AT&T"). This consumer-confusion focused test, which was explicitly rejected
by one United States district court interpreting the ACPA, see N. Light Tech., 97 F.
Supp. 2d at 117, would also permit a non-commercial use of a domain name such as
"microsoft-sucks.com" since consumers would not be confused into believing that site,
unlike a site such as "ATT2000.com," was actually hosted by the trademark owner.
[VOL- 76:1
NOTE: DOMAIN NAME DISPUTES
clause is irreconcilable with federal trademark law.i 2  That observa-
tion may have been true (at least in theory) on October 13-14, 1999
when the NCDNHC and Professors Froomkin & Weinberg published
their comments on the UDRP to ICANN's web-site.- 3 Before Novem-
ber 29, 1999, the Dilution Act controlled cybersquatting disputes in
federal courts.2 4 The Dilution Act, unlike the ACPA, applied only to
"commercial use"255 and further excepted (somewhat redundantly)
from its scope "[n]oncommercial uses of a mark."256 The ACPA, how-
ever, grants less clear protection to noncommercial use of a trade-
mark when tarnishment is intended. In determining bad faith, the
ACPA permits courts to consider "the person's bona fide noncommer-
cial or fair use of the mark ... ."5 In the next provision, however,
the ACPA allows courts to take account of
252 See Froomkin, supra note 69; Kleiman & Maher, supra note 212; Weinberg,
supra note 243.
253 See Froomkin, supra note 69; Kleiman & Maher, supra note 212; Weinberg,
supra note 243.
254 See supra Part IIA.
255 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1998).
256 IMt § 1125(c) (4) (B). Courts, however, have narrowly interpreted the Dilution
Act to find commercial use and dilution in cases involving seemingly noncommercial
uses. See Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1430,
1435-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), affd, 152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir. 1998); see alsoJels forJesus v.
Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 290 & n.13, 307-08 (D.N.J. 1998), aff'd, 159 F.3d 1351 (2d
Cir. 1998) (finding that the defendant's use of the "jewsforjesus.org" domain name,
which hosted a web-site criticizing the plaintiff's religious movement as being
"founded upon deceit and distortion," constituted commercial use under the Dilu-
tion Act). In Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. v. Bued, the defendant/
domain name holder hosted a pro-life web-site at "mw.plannedparenthood. corn."
42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1432. This web-page, which displayed the words "Welcome to
the PLANNED PARENTHOOD HOME PAGE!," promoted a pro-life book entitled
"The Cost of Abortion." Id. According to the defendant's counsel, this web-site, al-
though placed at a domain name corresponding to the plaintiff's trademark, was not
a commercial use, but rather "an effort to get the ... political and social message [of
the right to life] to people we might not have been otherise able to reach." Id. at
1433. The Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York, however,
declined to recognize this web-site advocating social and political change as a non-
commercial use on grounds that "(1) defendant is engaged in the promotion of a
book, (2) defendant is, in essence, a non-profit political activist who solicits funds for
his activities, and (3) defendant's actions are designed to, and do, harm plaintiff com-
mercially." Id. at 1435. The court concluded by declaring the use of the domain
name to be commercial on the separate ground that it "prevent(ed] users from reach-
ing plaintiff and its services and message." Id. at 1436. But see Bally Total Fitness Hold-
ing Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1167 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (holding a consumer
qomplaint web-site, placed at "www.compupix.com/ball)sucks," to be "speech pro-
tected by the First Amendment").
257 15 U.S.CA § 1125(d) (1) (B) (i) (IV) (West Supp. 2000).
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the person's intent to divert consumers from the mark owner's on-
line location to a site accessible under the domain name that could
harm the goodwill represented by the mark, either for commercial gain
or with the intent to tarnish or disparage the mark, by creating a likelihood
of confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorse-
ment of the site.
258
Thus, noncommercial use of a trademark in a domain name may be
protected as long as the domain name does not create a "likelihood of
confusion. '259 Nevertheless, the nine factor list for determining bad
faith is not exclusive (judges may consider other factors as they see
fit),260 and no factor or combination of factors is dispositive.261 To
further complicate predictions of the ACPA's application to noncom-
mercial uses (but also to help protect the rights of noncommercial
users), § 1125(d) (1) (B) (ii) introduces a subjective component by in-
structing courts that bad faith intent "shall not be found in any case in
which the court determines that the person believed and had reasona-
ble grounds to believe that the use of the domain name was a fair use
or otherwise lawful." 262 Since the ACPA is inherently ambiguous and
grants judges a significant degree of discretion, only future case law
can completely define the scope of the Act's application to noncom-
mercial uses.
The district court's decision in Morrison & Foerster LLP v. Wick263
offers some early indication that courts may not, as a general rule,
find in favor of defendants hosting "gripe" web-sites at a domain name
"confusingly similar" to the plaintiff's trademark. In Morrison & Foers-
ter, the court found bad faith where the defendant, seeking to "get
even" with "corporate America," placed web-sites blatantly tarnishing
the plaintiff's corporate law practice at domain names such as
"wv.morrisonandfoerster.com." 264 The court found crucial to its
holding the defendant's "intent to divert customers from Morrison &
Foerster's online location" and noted that the defendant's placement
of the web-sites at domain names "identical or confusingly similar to
Morrison & Foerster's mark [may cause a user to] wonder about Mor-
258 Id. § 1125(d) (1) (B) (i) (V) (emphasis added).
259 Id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(IV)-(V).
260 See id. § 1125(d) (B) (i).
261 See id.
262 Id. § 1125(d) (1) (b) (ii).
263 94 F. Supp. 2d 1125 (D. Colo. 2000).
264 Id. at 1132-33. Given the content of the defendant's web-sites, the court's bad
faith finding seems perfectlyjust. The web-sites displayed statements bitterly attacking
the plaintiff's law practice such as "no soul... no conscience.., no spine... NO
PROBLEMII," id. at 1133 (alterations in original), and contained links to Anti-Se-
mitic and racist web-sites, see id. at 1132.
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rison & Foerster's affiliation with the sites or endorsement of the
sites."265 The court concluded that the defendant was not entitled to
a separate First Amendment defense, partially on grounds that he
"could [have] simply display[ed] the content of his web pages in a
different location."266 Thus, the court in Morrison & Foerster an-
nounced a limitation roughly analogous to a "time, place, and man-
ner"267 restriction on speech that would have allowed the defendant
to place his protest web-page at a domain name such as
"www.idonotlikemorrisonandfoerster.com."
Nevertheless, although the Morrison & Foerster court suggested
that the defendant could have averted an injunction under the ACPA
by placing his web-sites at different domain names, the Act allows the
owner of a famous mark to proceed on grounds that the domain
name is "dilutive of that mark," without showing that the domain
name is "identical or confusingly similar."2r8 For this reason, the de-
fendant in Morrison & Foerster might not have been able to avert in-
junction by placing his web-site at a domain name such as
"morrisonandfoersterstinks.com," which is not confusingly similar, but
is arguably dilutive, of the plaintiff's trademark. Although the ACPA
could apply against a person registering and using a famous mark fol-
lowed by a dilutive suffix such as "sucks" or "stinks," a plaintiff will not,
in such a case, be able to rely on the bad faith checklist factor con-
cerning the defendant's "intent to divert consumers from the mark
owner's online location to a site accessible under the domain
name"2 69 to prove the defendant's bad faith intent to profit.
While it is unsettled under the ACPA whether a domain name
holder may place a gripe or protest web-page at a dilutive domain
name incorporating, but not identical or confusingly similar to, a
trademark, it is clear that the ACPA does not apply to web-sites hosted
at domain names that are not identical, confusingly similar, or dilutive
265 Id. at 1132.
266 Id. at 1135. "Nor can he argue that such an order would %iolate his First
Amendment right to free speech, as he has plenty of other outlets for his protest (i.e.,
just one of the three thousand domain names he owns would provide a sufficient
forum)." Id. (quoting Shields v. Zuccarini, 89 F. Supp. 2d 634, 641 (E.D. Pa. 2000)).
267 See generally GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SutLr,AN, Cosrrrtrnot.. LAw
1244-47 (13th ed. 1997) (quoting Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569,575 (1941));
Jom E. NowA & RoNALD D. ROTUNDA, CoNsTrroAL. Lw § 16.47, at 1142-43
(5th ed. 1995) (generalizing that courts uphold "time, place, and manner restrictions
on speech" where the "restriction on speech is outweighed by the promotion of signif-
icant governmental interests"). A complete treatment of constitutional issues raised
by applications of the ACPA is beyond the scope of this Note.
268 See 15 U.S.CA § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(I) (West Supp. 2000).
269 Id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(V).
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of a trademark irrespective of the web-site's content.270 Thus, while
the ACPA may impose some "time, place, and manner" limitations on
Internet speech, it never imposes "content-based restrictions," since it
regulates only domain name choices and does not address web-page
content at domain names that are not identical, confusingly similar, or
dilutive.271 Furthermore, the UDRP does not apply to any uses of do-
main names that are not "identical or confusingly similar"2 72 to the
complainant's trademark, even if the domain name causes dilution or
is used with the "intent to tarnish the trademark."275 The UDRP and
the ACPA do not, therefore, regulate noncommercial Internet speech
itself, but rather, impose some-although probably reasonable-lini-
tations on a noncommercial speaker's choice of domain names.
CONCLUSION
Considering the ever-increasing importance of the Internet and
e-commerce to corporate financial results, 1999 was definitely a year
of victory for trademark owners in the United States and worldwide.
Trademark owners worldwide finally have a compulsory administrative
procedure to reclaim domain names from cybersquatters quickly and
inexpensively in the vast majority of circumstances.27 4 Trademark
owners in the United States now also have a statute that directly ad-
dresses cybersquatting while providing a variety of remedies, including
substantial statutory damages of up to $100,000 per domain name.2 7r
The re-invigoration of federal trademark law by the ACPA is unlikely
270 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii).
271 See generally GuNrHE & SuLirvAN, supra note 267, at 1244-47 (discussing "time,
place, and manner restrictions"); i& at 1204-12 (discussing content-based restric-
tions); NoWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 267, § 16.47, at 1142-43 (stating that the Court
has employed a "least restrictive means test" and has also evaluated "whether the regu-
lation leaves open ample means for communication of the message and is not an
unnecessary or gratuitous suppression of communication" when determining the va-
lidity of "time, place, and manner restrictions"). The inapplicability of the ACPA to
web-sites at domain names that are not identical or confusingly similar to, or dilutive
of, a trademark, seems to "leave[] open ample means for communication," id., by
speakers on the Internet. Furthermore, the cause of action provided by the ACPA to
trademark owners against the holder of an identical, confusingly similar, or dilutive
domain name may, due to the exclusive nature of domain names, see supra note 40, be
the "least restrictive means," NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 267, § 16.47, at 1143, of
addressing cybersquatting.
272 UDRP, supra note 2, 4a(i).
273 Id 4c(iii); see supra notes 243-45 and accompanying text.
274 See supra Part I.
275 See supra Part II.B.
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to please advocates of Internet self-governance, 276 who would proba-
bly rather see ICANN accredited dispute resolution providers resolve
all domain name disputes than have courts apply the lav of a geo-
graphic jurisdiction, such as the United States, to the intrinsically in-
ternational Internet 277 Nevertheless, since the UDRP and federal law
provide different procedures, protect different substantive rights, and
offer different remedies, the UDRP and federal trademark law should
continue to co-exist without much friction for years to come. By
greatly expanding the rights of trademark owners, the UDRP and the
ACPA, however, have the inevitable effect of placing some limitations
on the rights of domain name holders. Nevertheless, the potential of
both the UDRP and the ACPA to cause major problems for domain
name holders such as "reverse domain name hijacking" and restric-
tions on free speech seems minor and can always be addressed by
ICANN and Congress in the future. In any event, the UDRP and the
ACPA appear poised to serve as effective and complementary solutions
to trademark-domain name disputes well into the twenty-first century.
276 SeeJeri Clausing, Out on a Limb as Technologies Conterg" One Step Fomard, One
Back for Internet Names Pane4 N.Y. Toms, Jan. 3, 2000, at C3 (calling the ACPA an
"usurp[ation of] Icann's first attempt at policy making").
In a world of jealous nation-states and cutthroat geopolitics, the odds of
transforming the Internet into a self-governing institution might seem long.
But that is the bet the Clinton administration placed in creating the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, and 2000 will likely deter-
mine the future of Internet self-governance.
Id.
277 See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyber-
space 48 STAN. L. REv. 1367, 1367 (1996) (predicting that "territorial authorities may
yet learn to defer to the self-regulatory efforts of Cyberspace participants... [and
that] [s]eparated from doctrine tied to territorial jurisdictions, new rules will emerge
to govern a wide range of new phenomena that have no clear parallel in the nonvir-
tual world"); Robert C. Bordone, Note, Electronic Online Dispute Resolution: A Systems
Approach-Potentia, Problems, and a Proposa4 3 HFARv. NEcOT. L. RE,. 175, 181-83
(1998) (arguing that the Internet's "elimination of boundaries"justifies a ne., uni-
form system of rules for dispute resolution detached from ph)sical jurisdictions).
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